The Marshall plan and its achievements by Wang, Ching-Tao
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1950
The Marshall plan and its
achievements
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/5393
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Thesis 
THE MARSHALL PLAN AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS 
by 
Ching~Tao Wang 
A.B., St.John's University,l946 
M.B.A., Boston Univercsity, 1950 
Submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the 
degree of 
Master of Arts 
1950 
=====!!=== ============'· •- -================:!l==o==== 
-"-
A 1"1 
I q 5 0 
======~=====================~============================~~====== ~~1 I 
II 
Approved 
by 
First Reader •• ~ 
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS Jl 
I· 
Second Reader •• • ~1!-.~. r.:. ~ 
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS 
CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I THE INTRODUCTION OF MARSHALL PLAN l 
A;_The Economic Background of E.R.P. l 
a. Basic Crises in Europe During 1946 & 1947 2 
1. Food and Fuel Shortage 2 
2. Industrial Recovery Slow 3 
3. Trade Deficit 4 
b. Political Chaos 7 
B. Marshall's Proposal for European Recovery 8 
c. European Reaction 9 
D. Passage of the Foreign Assistance Act 15 
a. American Foreign Economic Policy Since 1947 15 
b. The appointment of Committees 16 
e. United States Ability to Support Program 17 
d. Comparison of u.s. Ability to Support the 18 
Program and European Requirements reported 
by CEEC 
e. Hearings held in the Houses of Congress 26 
1. Arguments in Favor of the Plan 26 
2. Arguments against the Plan 28 
f. Public Attitude towards the Plan 29 
E. The General Scope of the Plan 29 
a. Amount and Purpose of Assistance 29 
b. Allocation of the Aid 30 
c. Forms of Assistance 31 
d. Supervision over Aid 32 
II SELLING UNDER THE MARSHALL PLAN 35 
A. Operation Procedures of E.R.P. 36 
B • . Special Condi tiona to be Met in Handling 45.:-
ECA Shipments 
a. Use of Procurement Authorization Number 45 
b. Marking Requirement 46 
c. Insurance 46 
d. Delivery 47 
e. Export Licences 48 
f. Price Limitation 49 
g . Commissions 49 
h. Airmail Distribution of Ocean Bills of 50 
Lading 
II 
I 
Chapter Page 
II (Cont'd) 
c. Financing By ECA 50 
a. Types of Reimbursement 50 
b. Documents required for Reimbursement 51 
III ECA ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE DURING THE FIRST 18 53 
MONTHS AND PROGRESS OF THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY 
PROGRAM 
A. Allotment of Aid 53 
B. Flow of Supplies 55 
a. Food, Feed and Fertilizer 57 
b. Fuel · 57 
c. Raw Materials and Semi-finished Products 58 
d. Machinery and Vehicles 58 
e. Other Products 59 
f. Shipping Services 60 
c. Procurement Trends 60 
D. Industrial Projects 61 
E. Local Currency Couterpart Funds 64 
F • Progress or European Recovery Program 69 
a. Industrial Production 71 
b. Output or Basic Industries 75 
c• Employment in ERP Na. tiona 76 
d. Agrtcultural Production 77 
e. International Trade 78 
I 
IV ECA AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 80 
84 
87 
A. Agricultural Products 
B. Manufactured Products 
CONCLUSIONS 88 
A • . The Dollar Gap in Review 89 
B. Taxpayer:.' s Interest rr82 
c. Parallel Considerations 93 
D. The Job Can Be Done 93 
a. What European Government Can Do 93 
b. What European Business And Labor Can Do 94 
c. What US Government Can Do 95 
d. What US Business and Labor Can Do 95 
e. What the OEEc:· Can Do 96 
I 
H 
~~ BIBLI OGRAPHY 
ABSTRACT 
! 
I 
II 
= 
I 
_j 
Table 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
.Graph 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IXa. 
JXb. 
X 
XI 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
EUROPE'S TRADE WITH NON-EUROPE COUNTRIES 6 ~ 
ALLOTMENTS TO PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES 54 
BY TYPE OF AID, - APRIL 1948 to SEPT. 1949 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, RATE OF EXPANSION 72 
AUTHORIZED PROCUREMENT OF SURPLUS AGRI- 86 ~· 
CULTURAL COMMODITES FROM THE UNITED STATES 
LIST OF GRAPHS 
Page 
ERP LONG RANGE PROGIDUv~ING 38 
PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF SUPPLY PROGRAM 39 
HOW AN IMPORTER GETS THE GOODS 40 
HOW ECA PAYS THE BILL 41 
ALTERNATE METHODS OF PAYMENT 42 
THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES 56 
PROCUREMENT TRENDS 60 
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS APPROVED BY ECA 62 
TYPE OF INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS 63 
STATUS OF EUROPEAN COUNTERPART FUNDS 65 
ERP COUNTERPART FUNDS - PROGRAM APPROVALS 66 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 73 
Gl'S.Ph 
XII 
XIII 
XIV 
KEY INDI CATORS OF EUROPEAN RECOVERY 
VOLUME OF COMMODITY TRADE 
IMPACT OF ERP ON UNITED STATES EXPORTS 
Page 
74 
79 
83 I 
li 
, 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an exposition of the economics of 
the European Recovery Program. By any test, the European 
Recovery Program is the mos t outstanding relief and aid pro-
gram r endered in the history. The sums involved are gigantic 
and the characteristics of this program are distinctively 
different from any aid program extended by this nation 
previously. 
Chapter I of this thesis presents the economic 
background of the European Recovery Program, the passage 
of the Foreign Assistant Act in 1948 and its general scope. 
Chapter II gives the general presentation of the operating 
procedures of the European Recovery Program and methods 
and techneques necessary for the American exporters to 
know in selling goods under the European Recovery Program 
financed shipments. Fbllowing that, Chapter III discusses 
the total ECA assistance given to the participating nations 
during the first eighteen months of the Program. It is 
treated by commodity groups and various types of aida 
rendered. A general review of the progress made by the 
participating nations since the European Recovery Program 
is also incl uded. 
Chapter IV deale with the impact of this program 
i 
• 
--
to the American Economy, and finally, the Conclusion Chapter 
studies whether the prevailing difficulties in West Europe 
could be overcome or not • 
ii 
CHAPTER I 
THE I NTRODUCTION OF MARSHALL PLAN 
A. The Economic Background of European Recovery Plan 
War pays its priee. Allied victory in Europe 
had been obtained only at the price of the destruction of 
some of the centers of production, the dislocation of the 
transport system and the sacrifice of shipping and foreign 
investment, upon which- the whole European economy had so 
heavily depended. 
In 1945, Europe was perhaps more denuded of re-
sources than at any time in modern history. There was a 
s~artage of all basic materials; of fertilizers to renovate 
the soil, of raw materials and equipment to quicken produc-
tion, and in most countries, of available labor. Since 
the end of the Second World War, t he United States has aM-
tended about 1 2 billion dollars in aids to Western Europe 
in two years, 8 billion doll ars in the f orm of credits and 
1 
l oans and 4 billion dollars in the form .of grants. The 
help given West ern Europe has undoubtedly prevented mass 
starvation, social and economic chaos, and has been of in-
dispensable economic assistance. 
However, economic recovery in Europe was slow. 
The European economy was still in the convalescent stage up 
1. Winthrop w. Aldrich, an address on •The foreign 
Assistance Act of 19488 before a Luncheor Meeting of the 
1 
C1eYeland Chamber-of~~~ ~Jl~~and-Wo~~=======*======= ========~Association, published by the Chase National Bank of the 
City of New York in May 1948. 
, 
to 1947, Particularly 1n the winter of 1946 and 1947, 
European recovery suffered a most serious setback as a result 
of the continued shortage of coal, the increased cost of 
primary products, and prolonged world shortage of food and 
other essential commodities. American newspapers suddenly 
blossomed forth with ~arrowing descriptions of European 
starvation, crop failures, floods, blizzards, drought, fuel 
shortage, bread riots, and finally general strikes in France 
and Italy. On the other hand, European nations realized 
that their American loans were used up and their rel~ef 
funds to all countries were exhausted. Yet, there was no 
tangible evidence of even the first signs of recovery. 
Once .again1 the United States was appealed to by 
the European nations to relieve their starvation and cold 
winters as well as to help t hem to rise to a self-supporting 
level_. 
a. Basic Crises in Europe during 1946 and 1947:- In 
order to cut through the confusion, we may summarize the 
crises that prevailed then in Europe as being composed of 
the following factors:-
1. Food and Fuel Shortage. - Despite of UNRRA's relief 
-ta 
shipments of more than 2 billion dollars to the war deva~ted 
nations in Europe after the war, the basic c~il!s in Western 
Europe in 1947 was an acute food shortage. By and large, 
recovery in agriculture c. has been slow. In the critical areas 
2 
of bread grains, the output in the crop year 1946 to 1947 
was only 75 per cent of the prewar volume; butter, eggs, 
~ cheese and milk were only 62 to 75 per cent. There was 
simply not enough food and fuel to go around in the world 
at that time. American dollars will not create food. Even 
if handed over to Europeans and spent freely in u.s. markets 
1 
they would j ust serve to bid up its price. 
in the form of food were of prime necessity. 
Therefore, grants 
After the shortage of food, the decline in the pro-
duction of coal and steel was perhaps the hardest blow to 
the economy of Europe. Immediate rehabil1£ation was made 
difficult; urgent domestic needs pushed aside t he claims of 
the export trade thereby further reducing capacity to buy 
vital industrial equipment abroad. ~cept in Germany, European ! 
forests were generally over-cut particularly in the oc-
cupied countries and the United Kingdom. Timber exports 
from Northeastern Europe fell oft sharply with serious re-
2 
percussions in the basic industries of Wester Europe. 
2. Industrial Recovery Slow •.. - The industrial. output 
in Europe compared to 1938 (including Germany, excluding Russia 1 
was only 86 percent. On t he other hand, Europe's population 
has gone up. There are twelve million more people now than 
there were in 1938 (always excluding Russia, for which no 
1. Michael L. Hoffman, " An Economic Picture of EYrg»e: 
The Task Now before the ERP", New York Times, E-5, Apr!!:tl, 
~~. . 
2. Excerpts from the official text of the General 
====~R~~e_port ot_CEEC~h&pjje~-di1ator1cal-In:troduc-t1-o~W:O.r~d 
Report, 3:29-32, October 7, 1947. 
3 
figures available). Furthermore, Europe's recovery has been 
best in those industries most essential to general recons-
truction and in new investments - coal, iron, steel construc-
tion and engineering. Producton of consumer4 goods lags far 
behind the actual needs of people. 
3. Trade Deficit. - Europe's trade with the outside 
world suffered serious adverse in the post-war years. There 
was an acute shortage of dollars in the European market. 
Intensified trade deficits and dollar famine in World War II 
and after reflect war, production crisis abroad and many of 
1 
the other factors abroad. 
Europe was running a trade deficit even before 
the war. Fbr instance, the total imports of Europe 1n 1938 
were $5.8 billion and their receipt from export were only 
3.7 billion dollars. Therefore, Europe incurred an import 
balance of 2.1 billion dollars. However, Europe had a sub-
stantial credit balance in the invisible accounts at that 
time. Europe's investment income in the prewar years was 
around 1.4 billion dollars and for other current items (for 
example, shipping, travel, military expenditures) a credit 
balance of $0.7 billion. The remainder of the total trade 
deficit was usually offset by credits and loans from the 
2 
United States and the movement of gold. 
1. Seymour E. Harris, "The European Recovery Program", 
p.47, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1948. 
2. !Q!g., p~.50-51. 
4 
~-
The trade de fi cit o·~ ~-Europe has been greatly in-
tensifi ed from 2,1 billion dollars in 1938 to 5.1 billion 1 . 
and 6 .9 billion in 1946 and 1947 respectively, This is 
mainly because of the follo wing reasons:-
(i) Political confusion and uncertainty in Europe 
and Asia intensified the breakdown of trade between \'/estern 
Europe on the one hand and Eastern and Central Europe and 
Asia on the other. Western Europe was thus unable to pay 
for its excess of imports from America with income received 
from exports and invisible credits from the East; and, with 
exports from Eastern Europe and Germany to Western Europe 
drastical ly reduced, was f orced to find alternative sources 
2 
of supplies, Europe's investment income declined from $1.4 
billion to $0 .4 billion in 1947 and for other current items 
a credit of $0.7 billion was converted into a deficit of 
$1.0 billion. (The net adverse change on invisible account 
for the 16 ERP nations and Western Germany has been estimated 
3 
at 1·. 5 billion dollars) .• 
(ii) The second important factor is the rise of 
prices. particularly in the Uni t ed St ates and the other 
Amerieas. A rise in import prices for countries with large 
excesses of i mports may be very costly. The following table 
shows the relative contributions of the effects of rising 
1. Op.Citl , Seymour E, Harris, p.S0-51. 
2. ~ •• p,l26. 
3. ~ •• p.so 
5.· 
I l __ 
prices upon the trade deficit of European Countries:-
TABLE I 
EUROPE'S TRADE WITH NON- EUROPE COUNTRIES 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
* 
1 
1938 1946 1947 
Current Current 1938 Cur~ent 1938 
Prices Prices Prices 
., . 
Prices Prices 
Imports,f,b,b, •• 5,820 9,400 5, 3!50 13,000 6,200 Exports,f,o,b • •• 3,730 4,300 2; 300 6,100 2,900 Trade Deficit •• -2,090 -5,100 -3,050 -6,900 -3,300 
*A surve7 of Economic Situati on and Prospects of Europe, 
Prepared by the Economic Commission for Europe, UN Economic 
and Social Council, March 1948, p,57, 
It is clear:-that had prices of imports and exports 
not risen, the adverse balance on trade account from 1938 to 
1947 would have increased by but $1,2 billion ( $3.3 billion 
- $2.1 billion), two-thirds or this being associated w1 th 
a decline in real export s, and one-third with a rise in real 
imports, Had prices of exports and imports not changed over 
these years, Europe's over~seas trade deficit in 1947 would 
2 
have been leas than one-half as large as it actually was. 
(iii) In addition to the above mentioned numerous 
European nations even before the war were far from selt-
sufficient in food; the percentage of production to require-
ments was 32 for the United Kingdom, ~7 for Switzerland and 
Norway, 62 for the Netherlands, 75 for Austria, and 83 for 
France. It is quite clear that countries normally dependent 
1, Op.Cit., Seymoun E. Harris, p,SO. 
2, ,llig. 
6 
on foreang ~ources of food supplies are greatly injured by --
a reducti on in cereal out-put by 14% (1946-1947 as compared 
to prewar output), At the same time, they confronted with 
\ 
popul:ation increases o~ about 10 percent over prewar levels, 
there~ore they will inde.ed requiretiaddi tional help from 
1 
abroad, 
In summary, the adverse balance of payments of 
the European nations was caused by the breakdown of trada 
and produetton, the rise of import prices, losses in invisible 
exports, the crop failures of 1947, the segmentation of market , 
a worsening in the terms of trade and to some extent, mis-
2 
taken policy, 
b, Political Chaos, - Perhaps the most forceful drive 
towards the re~ization of the Marshall Plan was caused by 
the rising wave of Communism in the European nations, Des-
pite the best intentions of the member s of the United Nations 
attempting to realize a more cooperative and peacefUl post-
war world, the world has been gradually split into two blocs: 
3 
the West against the Communist- nations, 
By the end of 1947, Russia has virtually occupied 
and controlled Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Eastern Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgar~a, 
Albania and Finland, In addition, internal disputes were 
1, Op,Cit,, S,E,Harris, p,95, 
2, ~ •• p,l26. 
3. U.S, News and World Report, "ABC's of Aid for 
Europe: Where the Dollars Will Go", pp.l4=15, published by 
USNews Publishing Corp,, March 19, 1948. 
7 
dividing almost every country in Western Europe. All countries 
on the continent have domestic Communist parties to contend 
with. A severe civil war was raging in Greece. It was 
to~ and gp in Italy and France. Concurrently, there were 
disputes between socialists and capitalists, between farmers 
and city dwellers, between workers and employers, all finding 
1 
their way into polities. 
B; Marshall's Proposal ~Gr European Recover:r 
In view of the crises which prevailed in Eur~pe, 
the then Secretary of State of United States, George ~~rshall, 
made his proposal for European Recovery in a speech on June 
5, 1947. The crucial point of his porposal was that European 
nations must help themselves through cooperative efforts 
and then a large scale American "friendly aid" will be 
extended. 
The Historical Speech of Secretary Marshall at 
Harvard University reads: 
" ••••• Europe's requirements for the next three or four 
years of foreign food and other essential products --
principally from America -- are so much greater than 
her present ability to pay that she must have substantial 
additional help or face economic, social and political 
deterioration of a very grave character. 
The remedy lies in breaking t he vicious circle and 
restoring the confidence of the European people in the 
economic future of their own countries and of Europe as 
a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout 
~. u.s. News and World Report, n ABC's of Aid for 
Europe: Where the Dollars Will Go•, pp.l4=15, March J.9,. 1948. 
8 
wide areas must be able. and willing to exchange their pro-
ducts ~or currencies the continueing value of which is not 
open to question. 
••••• It is logical that the United States should do whatever 
it is able to do to assist in the return o~ normal economic 
health in the world, without which there can be no political 
stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not 
against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, 
desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival 
of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emer-
gence of political and social conditions in which :free in-
stitutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced must 
not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. 
Any assistance that this government may render in the future 
should provide a cure rather than a mere palliztive. 
It is already evident that, before the United States 
Government can proceed much :further in its efforts to alle-
viate the situation and help start the European world on its 
way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the coun-
tries of Europe as to the requirem·ents of the situation and 
the part t hose countries t hemsel ves will take in order to 
give proper effect to whatever setion might be undertaken by 
this government. ,...a:t,:~woul:d]; nott..tbe fitting for this government 
to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe 
on its feet economically. That is t he business of Europeans. 
The initiative, I think, must come :from Europe. The role 
of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting 
an European Program and of later support of such a program 
so far as it may be pract ical :for us to do so. The program 
should be a joint one, agreed to by a number of, if not all 
European nations.n 1 
c. European Reaction 
Secretary Marshall's nsimple suggestion" as he has 
since termed it, received immediate acclamation, particularly 
:from France and Britain, and the governments of both coun-
tries almost simultaneously initiated action to explore the 
problem. 
On June 16, Mr. Bevin visited M.Bidault in Paris. 
A~ter two days o~ exploratory conversations, the British and 
1. European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery, 
=====#-==t~--pt. e>f=~ate~DTrca~S82;=EilroJYe ·- rs- - • 
9 
French foreign ministers issued a Joint communique welcoming 
the proposals of the Marshall Plan, and invited the Soviet 
government to associate itself with them in framing a reply 
to Mr.Marshall. 
On June 27, Mr.Bevin, M.Bidault, and Mr. Molotov 
met in Paris to discuss the implications of the Marshall 
Plan and to seek some common ground from agreement. However, 
the insistence o·f Russians that assets and needs be decided 
on a strictly national basis and their refusal to agree to 
any general ~uropean economic program resulted in the break-
down of these negotiations. 
On ~uly 3, Mr. Bevin and M.Bidault decided them-
selves to issue invitations to a conference in Paris to all 
other European countries except Spain. In addition to the 
United Kingdom and France, fourteen countries, ~ Austria., 
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Turkey - sent delegates to the Paris Conference for European 
Economic Cooperat ion to collaborate 1n setting up a temporary 
organization to bring together data on the basis of which a 
1 
program of European reconstruction could be developed. 
Since Russia and its satelites refused to take part, Europe 
became divided; Eastern Europe fell under totalitarism and 
Western Europe Joined to a cooperative effort to imrove its 
economic position and to defend itself from the spread of 
1. Op.Cit., WW Aldrich,p.5. 
10 
2 
Communism. 
a. Report of Committee of European Bconomic Cooperat1on.-
A report was made by the Committee of European Economi.c Co-
operation and was signed by the sixteen nations at Paris on 
September 22, 1947. It conta~s 690 pages and was presented 
to Secretary of State Marshall. The report maps out the 
nations own efforts to make themselves and Western Europe 
as a whole a going concern by three steps: self-help of 
each nation; mutual help for all the sixteen nations; American 
1 
Aid. 
What is unparalleled is the magnitude of the con-
templated cooperative effort, the breadth of vision and the 
degree of determination which i s involved. 
Each participating country has pledged itself: 
1. to develop its production to reach the targets, es-
pecially for food and coal; 
2. _to make the fullest and most effective use of ita 
existing productive capacity and all available manpower; 
3. to modernize its equipment and transport, so that 
labour becomes more productive, conditions of work are improved, 
and standard of living of all peoples of Europe are raised; 
4. to apply all necessary measures leading to the rapid 
achievement of internal financial monetary and economic 
stability while maintaining in each country a high level of 
p.fo. - 2. Committee of European Economic Cooperation: 
Geperal Report, Dept. pf State, Publication 2930, European 
Series 28, Vol.!, p.9. 
1. Dewitt John1_"Th~ M§!;!:ehall Plan - Its ABC, and Ur-=====#==;g;.;;;ero~e'"y :=wt1:1---r~e-EUiypei" OHFrs-e-ta.n Science MO"fU'tar, 
39:9, Sept.26, 1947. · 
11 
employment• 
5. to cooperate with one another and with like-minded 
countries in all possible steps to reduce the tariffs and 
other barriers to the expansion of trade both between thea-
selves and with the rest of the world, in accordance with 
the principles of the draft Charter for an International 
Trade Organization; 
6, to remove progressively the obstacle s to the fre e 
movement of persons within Europe; 
7, to organize together the means by which common resource 
1 
can be developed in partnership. 
The sixteen nations had fitted together into a 
four-year plan, from 1948 to 1951, their proposed individual 
and collective steps to get Europe onto i ts feet with American 
hel p . This plan has two parts: Production t arget and pledges 
of other measures. 
(a ) Production Target: Pr oduction plans were focused 
on those fi~s which form " the Basis of Economic Life" such 
as food, agriculture, fuel, power, steel, timber and transport, I 
together with such related industries a s agricultural and 
mining machinery and the l abor problem. The general idea is 
to restore and to expand the production of these fields to 
the prewar levels, or even pigber in the four year period 
2 
from 1948 to 1951. 
1, Op,Cit, CEEC report, p,l3. 
2. Op,Cit. Dewitt John. 
12 
The sixteen nations expected to achieve the followin 
results by 1951• 
(i) Restoration of prewar bread grain and other 
cereal production, with large increases above prewar in 
sugar, and potatoes, some ihcreases in oil and fats, and as 
fast an expansion in live-stock products as supplies of feeding 
stuffs will allow. 
(ii) Increase of coal output to 584 mi lli on t ons, 
i,e, 145 million t ons over· the 1938. 
(iii) Expansion of electricity output by nearly 
70,000 million Kvm or 40 percent above 1947 and a growth of 
generating eapacity by over 25 million KW or 2/t3 above prewar. 
(iv) Development of oil refining capacity 1nterms 
of crude oil throughout by 17 million tons to two and a 
half times the prewar level. 
(v) Increase of crude steel production by 80 per 
cent above 1947 to a level of 55 million tons or 10 million 
tons (20%) above 1938. 
(vi) Expansion of inland transport facilities to 
carry a 25 % greater load in 1951 t han in 1938. 
(vii ) Restoration of prewar merchant fleets of the 
1 
participating countries. 
(b) As to the other pledges, the sixteen nations pro-
mised to carry out fiscal currency steps within their power 
1. Op,Cit,, CEEC Report, Vol.I, p,l4, 
2. Op,Cit., Dewitt John 
13 
to balance budgets and stabilize currency, and to abolish 
2 
as s oon as possible abnor mal trade restrictions. 
(c) American Help Needed. -
In order to co-ordinate this plan, Europe needs 
two tangible t hings from the United Sta t es to power ita 
recovery program - money and goods. 
As to the goods, Europe must get from the American 
continent : 30 million tons of bread grains and cereal feed 
stu~fs for each of t he four year; 200-300 thousand tons of 
nit rogen fertilizers for each of the f irst two year; overall 
estimates for t he four-year period of 50,000 heavy tractors 
and $700 million worth of machinery and spare part; about 
80 million t ons of coal for t he first two and a hart-year 
period; 220 million dollar's of mining equipment; 500 million 
dollar r worth of electr ic-projects and electrical equipment 
f or the over-all tour year period of 588.2 million dollars 
of specialized oil equipment; 1.51 million tons of iron-scrap 
in 1948 to 2.35 million tons in 1951; 2 million metric tons 
of finished steel for the period of the first two years; 
lbillion dollarr worth of all types of timber - softwood, 
hardwood, hardwood ties, pitprops, pulpwood and pQles; 103,000 
freight cars within the four year period; 25 million tons of 
dry-cargo shipping service and 8 million t ons to tanker service 
In money re~uirements are of two kinds: First, a 
1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division 
of Intercourse and Education, International Conciliation: 
The EuroPean Recoyerv Program, p.8o7-817, Seet1on if, 
De camber 1947. _ 
====-;!====-
14 
1 
sum of about l5,810,000, 000 dollars to balance the f our-year 
combined trade deficit of the sixteen nations; second, they 
1 
need a t 3,ooo,ooo,ooo fund tor currency stabilization. 
D. Passage of the Foreign Assistance Act 
a. American Fbreign Economic Policy Since 1947. - As 
to the American view point, the words stirred up all this 
commotion were contained in a single paragraph of Secretary 
Marshall's brief address at Harvard. The text of Secretary's 
remarks was issued in advance in a routine way, without any 
of the fanfare or "tips" to correspondents which ordinarily 
2 
precede significant utterances of this t~e• 
However* the United States has since developed a 
new foreign economic policy. Up until the beginning of 1947, 
the United States had made every effort to appease Russia 
in order to maintain cordial relations with her 1n spite of 
basic disagreements over the council tables. Now it appeared 
that the world was nearly bankrupt, and the United States 
was the only nation able to effect recovery. It t ook no 
particular astuteness or political acumen to r ealize how 
potent a weapon the nation held. More and morej' the European 
nations were siding with the United States in the United 
Nations sessions. Russia was outvoted again and again. 
There was no longer any need for ·u.s. appeasement of Soviet 
15 
1. op.Cit., p.7, Dewitt :John. 
2. Robert E. Summers, "Economic Aid to Europe: p.37, 
========~Be~¥~Wilsen~mpa~&¥ ¥a~9iB-=========================~======== 
Russia. 
Almost overnight the New American Fbreign Economic 
policy t ook shape, based upon two key principles: 
1. That the United States will aid free peoples 
everywhere who desire to live 1n peace with their neighbors. 
2. That there can be no lasting peace or prosperity 
until t he various nations get on t heir f eet again. 
The first is the basis of the Truman Doctrine, 
the second of the Marshall Plan. Both together form the 
l 
basis of American foreign economic policy today. 
b. 'fhe appointment of Comm1 ttees .• . - The enthusiasm of 
the response from Western Europe were astonishing - plea-
santly so - to the American Government. Three committees 
went to work on the problem as s oon as the Paris Conference 
was called. Their reports represent the factual evidence 
on which the case of the Marshall Plan is based. Few pie ces 
of l egislation in the United States have had the background 
of analysis and study comparable to that given to the Foreign 
Assistance Act. Committees of the Congress not only held 
extensive hearings, but sought f irst-hand information in 
Europe itself. The Report of the Committee of European Eco-
nomic Cooperation was subje cted to searching analysis by the 
6ta te Department. The impact of the prsram upon the American 
economy was reviewed by Harriman and Krug Committees and the 
1. Op.Cit., RoberLE. Summers, pp.38/9 
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President's Council of Economic Advisers. The Act is the 
result of a vast amount of preliminary study and documenta-
2 
c. United Stabes Ability to Support Program. _- After 
the comm.ittees considered the impact of such a program to 
the United States from three points of view: resources, 
productive capacities and price structure, both the Krug I 
Committee and the Council of Economic Advisers all emphaticall~ 
affirm that our resources, productive facilities, and the 
economy as a Y.hole can support sufficient aid to Europe 
to assure economic recovery. The Harriman Committee actually 
revised certain CEEC estimates; they concl~ded, however, 
that we could, with administrative controls and safeguards, 
maintain a P,rogram of aid to Europe adequate to meet essential 
1 
needs. 
All the Committees agree that maximum industry -
government cooperation will be needed, as well as exteeme 
.care in administration of the complex program. All strongly 
recommend adoption of control measures over those materials 
! ' 
in short supply which are of critical l importance for European 
~$covery in order to assure the most efficient flow and 
utilization of products with a minimum disruptive effect 
2 
upon economic life in the United States. 
1. Qp.Cit~ International conciliation, Section II, 
pp.834/5. 
2. ~. 
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d. Comparison of U.S. ability to Support the Program 
AND European Requirements reported by GEE0:-
1. Food and Agriculture .• - The original CEEC estimate 
of' cereal import requirements tor 1947 and 1948 of 30 million 
tons was finally reduced to 20 million tons on the basis of' 
probable availability as reported by the Special Cereals 
Conference of Fbod and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations and the International Emergency Food Council. The 
reduction brings the diets of the Western European na tiona 
close to the danger line and even the estimates for the 
succeeding years, 25 million tons annually, .are exceedingly 
modest. 
In order to meet even these minimum requirements 
a maximum effort will be required trom the United States 
to "conserve grain by all practical means in order to make 11 
increased quantities available for export" and to take firm 
measures to control the "serious inflation of grain and 
1 
food prices." 
2. Fertilizer. - Nitrogen was the only fertilizer in 
critically short supply. The CEEC countries estimate that 
,, Europe will have a net deficit in 1947 and 1948 of 270,000 
II 
tons of nitrogenous fertilizer, a large part of' which would 
have to come from the United States. As eaeh ton of f'ertili-
II zer enormously inc~eases grain output, thereby greatly de-
l 1. President's Council of Economic Advisers' Report, 
p.41-:ff'. 
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creasing expenditure of dollars for imported grain, all studies 
recommend an all-out effort to meet their needs. 
In view of the dependence upon United States re-
sources and the need to meet European nitrogen deficits as 
speedily as possible, the Harriman Committee recommended: 
(i) Establishment of fUll production from the presently 
unused synthetic capacity owned by the Government. 
(ii) Construct ion of facilities required at these plants 
I to permit the production of finished fertilizer-grade nitro-
! genous materials in integrated operations. 
(iii ) Sale or lease to private interests of the Govern-
ment-owned facilities with provisions to assure continued 
product ion and availability of fertilizer materials ror 
such times as the need continues. If this cannot be effectedi 
11 then continued Government operation as an emergency measure. 
3. Agricu1 tural Machine a. - It was generally agreed 
that the production of American agricultural machinery and 
equipment will be sufficient to cover the European needs. 
The ERP Report stated: "The present level of exports 
II of farm machinery, though about 50 percent higher than last 
year, has not deprived American farmers of needed equipment 
to the extent that any substantial reduction in food p~oduotion 
. I 
has resulted. Even if present exports, estimated at 12 ~~ I 
of production were -further increased to 50% by 1948 it is 
1. Harriman Report, Part III, pp.Al8-19. 
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I doubtful whether the amount of new machinery availabe for 
II 
II 
II 
II 
I 
II 
domestic use would be reduced since total production in 1948 
is likely to increase at least by an equivalent amount. 
Exports of farm equipment will not create any substantial 
1 
drain on United States raw material resources." 
4. QQ!!. - The CEEC estimated that the United States 
will have to make up yearly coal deficits in the amount of: 
41 million metric t ons in 1948. 25 million in 1949, 14 million 
in 1950 and 6 million 1n 1951. The announced reduction in 
I 
II 
lj imports from the United States is predicted upon the following 1 
I 
'I 
I' 
II 
anticipated increases in European production: 
IN MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS 
United Kingdom 
Western Germany 
France 
Poland 
231 
206 
48 
65_. 
199 
133 
50 
56 
214 
149 
5·1 
68 
249 
193 
63 
83 
The Harriman Committee considers these increases 
Jl over-optimistic and estimates that we ·will have to export 
~ 
11 125 million metric t ons in the four year period. Our 
coal resources are ample to meet this deficit until European 
facilities are restored to full operation. The only bottle-
II 
!I 
1. Op,Cit., International Conciliation, Section II. p.841 . 
2. Op.q1t., Krug Report, Part I p.l9. 
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1 
II neck is an acute shortage of coal ca;r:-s, 
II 5, Petroleum and Petroleum Equipment, ... - .. B~cause of the 
II increased consumption of fuel oil anticipated by the sixteen 
nations (owing to substitution for coal, mechanization of 
II agrecul ture, increased food transport, and general industrial 
II expansion) petroleum is second only to coal as a source of 
II energy for the European Re-covery Program. 
II Total petroleum requirements of all CEEC countries 
II in 1948 are estimated at 59,542,000 tons as compared with 
II 36, -224,000 tons 1n 1938, By 1951 requirements are expected 
11 to rise to nearly 77, 000 tons, 
1! ••••• , the bulk of requirement must be imported from non-
1 participating countriee, Approximately 45 per cent of the 
II total requirements must be secured from dollarr- sources, (Am-
11 eri can companies) , Based on July 1, 1947 f,o,b, prices the 
II total value of oil from dollar sources is $2,460,838,000 I 2 
I 
'I 
-I 
over the four year period. 
6, Electric-Generating Equipment, - The CEEC anticipates !1 
_j 
I 
I 
I 
that almost all of the electric generating, transmission and 
distribution equipment needed for the planned 21 million 
K.W, "national" expansion programs will be produced by the 
participating countries, Only $300 million of special equip-
ment will have to be obtained 1n the United States, All of 
1, Op.C~t., Harriman Report, Par II, p,G,6, 
2, Op.Cit., Int. Conciliation, Section II, p,851. 
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the equipment tor the 2.3 million KW "international" expansion 
however~ will be sought in the Onited States. The Harriman 
Committee agrees that such requirements can be fulfilled 
l 
without much difficulties by the United States. 
7. Steel. - The CEEC has estimated steel import requ1re-
.ments for the sixteen participating countries and Western 
Germany from the United States as follows: finished steel, 
other than sheets and tinplate- 449 thousand metric tons in 
1948 and none in subsequent years; sheets - 385 thousand 
metric tons in 1948, diminishing to none in 1951; tinplate-
291 thousand metric tons in 1948, diminishing to 250 in 1951; 
crude\ and semi-finished steel - 2,04o thousand metric tons 
in 1948, averaging approximately 2,130 annually for the re-
2 
maining period. 
Steel could be decisive in determining either the 
success or failure of the recovery program; There was no 
J definite solution as to the European requirements for their 
~I 
II 
recovery program. One of the principal limiting factors 
in the production of steel is scrap which is critically short 
throughout the world, However, the Harriman Committee con-
cluded t hat the present domestic demand for semi-finished 
steel precludes the possibility of substantially increasing 
our total exports i_n 1948 over those of 1947 (approximately 
360,000 metric t ons exported to the participating nations 
1. Op,Cit., CEEC Report, Vol,II, Table 5, p,269, 
2, Op,Cit., Harriman Report, Part II, pp,FS-9. 
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e. 
in 1947). 
"Imports of crude and semi-finished steel requested 
by the 16 participating countries are needed in part to reatone jl 
t~e normal functions of European industrial production,but also 
to produce steel products for the steel consuming industries 
of Western Europe and for export to non-participating countries 
to pay for needed imports of :rood and other necessities. 11 
Reductions below the C~EC estimates of 2,040,000 metric 
tons would result chiefly 1n the loss of the anticipated I 
dollar revenue from exports ot fin.ished products to non~arti- j 
cipating nations (thus increasing by that amount the total 
dollars needed from us), but may also in some instances reduce 
European steel consumption needed from economic rehabilitation." 1 
However, the recommendations of the Krug-Report 
for putting into production the US idle steel making facilities I 
is valuable if minimum critical needs at hao~ and abroad 
II are to be met. 2 
II a. Timber• - The world, including the United States, 
has an inadequate supply ot softwood timber and of the better 
11 quality hardwoods, Although the available data on European 
II 
II 
II 
requirements do not show clearly what kinds and grades are 
wanted, indications are that the demand will be heaviest 
on the more eritical items, those that are in short supply 
in the United States. If some flexi bility as to grades and 
species is permitted, it would seem that the quantities of 
timber products needed from American sources over the 4 year Jl 
3 
period, around $418 millions, is within reason. j 
9. Transportation ... - . CEEC report asked for 103,000 
freight ears for the four-year --period. However, o~ present 
production cannot meet present domestic demand. Europe will 
1. Op,Ci~. Harriman Report, Part II, pp.F.8/9. 
1 2. ~., International Conciliation, p.859. 
, 3. ~.,Harriman Report, Prt II, pp.F9-J2. 
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have to rely on its own inadequate resources to achieve trans-
portation goals essential for recovery. In order to meet 
this critical bottleneck, the Harriman Committee recommends 
that: 
1. 20,000 freight oars be produced in the United States 
for export to the Anglo-American Zone of Germany in 1948. 
2. the m~.jor European producers of freight cars stand 
ready to sell about lO,ooo cars from their 1948 production 
to otherparticipating countries. 
3. The United States Government should press for 
I prompt standardizat ion of freight ca~design. 
II 
11 
I 
4. Failure by European countries to r~aQh their loco-
motive production targets should not disproportionately re-
duce their deliveries to Germany. 
5. No railway passenger cars should be imported into 
Europe as part of Marshall Plan. 
6. The steel rail manufaeture planned in Europe be r e-
duced f rom 6.85 to 5.4 million tons for the four year period. 
7. The imports of 5.12 million cubic meters of wood for 
ties is not unreasoable - substitution of wood for steel, 
soft for hard wood, treating 1n Europe Where possible and 
import from other countries than the u.s. (is suggested) 
e. Further consideration be given to the desirability 
of importing some finished trucks into Europe in 1948 and 1949 
to relieve the strain on the railway. 
24 
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9. In allocatian of steel the European countries give 
• priority to transport uses, particularly the repair of rolling 
11 stock. 
II 
10 ••• the US Government drew the attention of those 
responsible to eases of discriminatory rates which divert 
traffic from its normal course, and point out that suCh un-
economic use of means is not 1n accordance with the spirit 
of the Marshall Plan, 
11, The United States should use its influence to promote 
an i.nternational agreement on road haulage, 
12, More freight cars should be allocated to the short-
haul of coal to steel mills in the Ruhr. 
13. The United States Government should encourage re-
1 
patriation of freight cars by bilateral agreement. 
10, Shipping. - "There is no shortage of dry cargo 
ships to carry any world commerce that is likely to develop 
11 under an aid program for the next several years, but the 
Tanker problem may become quite critical by 1951 if appro-
11 2 
priate action is not taken". 
I The world tanker capacity of 60 million long tons -
jj three fifths of which are under the u.s. flag- is being used 
to the full capacity. The Harriman Committee recommands 
' 
as part of the aid program the transfer to foreign governments 
1, Harriman Report, Op,Cit., Partiii, pp,H62-63 
2, Harriman Report, Op.Cit., Part II, p,H5. 
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of some special tanker types now in lay-up, These vessels, 
consisting principally of nearly sixty Liberty tankers, are 
not needed by United States interests and they could be sold !I 
by the receiving government to private interests in f oreign 
1 countries for local currency. It is further suggested that 
j the presently planned balance between foreign construction 
II 
II 
of dry goods and taker vassals be shifted to provide for 
1 
more tanker construction and less dry cargo, 
e. Hearings held in the Houses of Congress. - Based on 
the materials in the various reports, there were lengthy 
I hearings held 1n the both Houses of Congress. The critical 
lj 
I 
arguments on this plan are as follows:-
1. Arguments in favor of the Plan 
{ i) Europe's Importance to the us. - Europe a1 ways 
has had close relations with the United States, The United 
States cannot get along without Europe. To get along without 
Europe would 1n economic sense come close to getting along 
,, . without the rest of the world, In the first place, 21 per 
1 cent of our imports in 1938 which came from the sixteen plan-
1 nations included many manufactured goods that the United 
'I I 
I 
I 
I
I States has heavily depended, More important, although Europe 
is not the s ource of many of our essential raw-material imports, 
II bu; its colonies are. Their exports to us would be disrupted II 
j in the event of collapse of the mother nations. 
On the export side, getting along without Europe 
26 
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1. Op,Cit., International Conciliation., Section II, 
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would mean pretty much as getting along without exports. The 
Marshall Plan countries together took 25 percent of our total 
exports in 1938. The economic dislocation of Europe would 
also cut heavily our exports to non-European countries, 
whose ability to buy our products would be sharply reduced 
by the inability t o acquire dollar exchange from the sale of 
commodities to Europe. It need hardly be said that an area 
normally responsible for more than half the world's trade 
could not be eliminated without a major disruption in world 
1 
economy - a disruption from which we would suffer. 
(ii) A Weapon to Defeat Communism. - The United 
States spent $350 billion to defeat Germany and Japan from 
domination of the world. The main reason 1t cost so much 
was that the United States did not start spending in earnest 
until the Germans had under their control nearly all of 
Europe, and the Japanese had the most important parts of 
Asia. The United States bought victory in about the toughest 
possible market. 
Now the leaders of another · country- Russia-
want to dominate the world. It would be cheaper to spend 
17 billion dollars now te prevent the Soviet domination that 
2 
than to have another war. 
1. AlgerrHiss, "Basic Quest~ons in the Great Debate", 
New York Times Magazine, p.7, November 16, 1947. 
2. Time Editorial, "What Price Peace?", 50-24-5, 
July 21, 1947. 
There were of course some other arguments; however, 
the two points mentioned may be considered as the most forceful 
ones. 
2. A£guments against the Plan: 
(i) Aid to Europe at the rate proposed by the Euro-
pean means $e,ooo,ooo,ooo in t~es to the American people 
1 
over and above what they would otherwise pay. 
I 
I Over;.-burdening 
1 
taxes on the people is economically unsound to the American 
economy. 
( ii) The adoption of the Marshall Plan has a 
direct tendency to inflate prices fUrther in the United 
States. There can be no doubt that the tremendous rate of 
exports plays a material part in the increase in the price 
level we have seen during the years. The production of the 
United States is pretty well balanced with the consumption 
of the United States people. When impose on top of this 
balance 20 billion dollars foreign purchases, we can harly 
be surprised that the great increase in demand outruns our 
2 
supply fand forces prices up. 
Each argument has its basic validity. This gi-
gant1c program involves a great deal of complexity. The 
strength and the defects of the program cannot be measure 
to near accuracy. \~ether the program will be a success or 
a failure is beyond human foresight. 
1. Senator Robert A. Taft, an address before Ohio 
Society of New York,. Nov.lO, 1947, Congressional Record, 
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f. Public Attitude towards the Plan • . - Mr.George Gallup, 
Director of American Institute of Public Opinion made surveys 
-
probing public opinion on this issue. The survey made in 
November 1947 indicates that 47% was in favor of this plan, 
15% against the plan and 38% with no opinion. The public 
opinion in December showed an increasing tendency in favor 
of this issue. The respective percentages were 56 per cent, 
17 per cent and 27 per eent. The survey turther indicates 
that of various arguments given in favor of the Marshall 
plan, the one which seems most effect ive with the public 
1 
is the argument that it will halt the spread of Communism. 
Nevertheless, looking into the program in a deeper 
sense, we may find that there is to acertain degree a compo-
nent of selfishness in public opinion. To many people, it 
had been sold to them as the only way to stop communism; to 
many others, it is a substitute for military aid. To people 
Who feel good only when other people are feeling good, it 
is a humanitarian seheme. To farmers, manufacturers and 
others of little faith who were beginning to worry about 
2 
surplus production, it is a hand~ solution. 
E. The General Scope of the Plan 
a. Amount and Purpose of Assistance. - '!he Foreign Assis-
tance Act was passed 1n both Houses of Congress and signed 
1. George Gallup, "Marsh~l Plan Gains Favor w1 th 
Bublic", Dallas Morning News, 63~11, Dec.7, 1947. 
- 2.Jor-tune-Ed.i.torlal,_!!EQA~aaJ:t DG.=Eve.n.Y-th-iAA" 
p.73, Volume XXXIX No.2, Feb. 1949. 
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by President Truman on April 3, 1948; It authorized a foreign 
aid program of #6,098,000,000 for the period of 12 months 
from June 1948 to June 1949. Of this amount, #5,300,000,000 
is assigned to the European Recovery Program; #275,000,000 
to Greek-Turkish military aid; #338,000,000 to economic aid 
for China and $125,000,ooo to military aid; and $6o,ooo,ooo 
to the International Children's Emergency Fund of the United 
1. 
Nations. Although this act carries four major programs, 
we may note that its focal point is the European Recovery 
Program. 
While expenditures are authorized for only one 
year, the act envisages the recovery program as contin~g~ 
un~il. June 30, 1952. Funds are to be appropriated annually 
in order that subsequent sessions of congress may review 
the success of the program. According to estimates of the 
State Department, the cost of the European Recovery Program 
to the United States Government may aggrega~e about 17 billion 
dollars between April 1, 1948 and June 30, 1952. The exact 
amount will, of course, depend on many contingencies Which 
2 
cannot now be foreseen or appraised. 
b. Allo·cation of the Aid. - Aid to Western Europe is 
to be granted to t he nations participating 1n the recovery 
program. These include the sixteen nations, together with 
I their dependent areas, which signed the report of the Com-
., 
1. Op.Cit., W.W.Aldrich. 
2. Ibid. 
30 
mittee of European Economic Cooperation at P~ie on Bept.22, 
1947. The sums alloca ted to the participating nations for 
1 
the first twelve months are: -
Great Britain ••• ••• • $1,500,000,000 France • • • • •• ·1,100, 000,000 W.Germany ••• ••• aoo,ooo, ooo Benelux • • • • ••• 8~0, 000, 000 Italy ••• ••• 700, 000,000 Norway and Sweden ••• • 200,000,000 Western Austria 
• • • ••• 100, 000, 000 Greece ••• ••• 100,000, 000 Iceland • • • • •• lO. ooo. ooo $5,310, 000, 000 
The aid extended by t he United States will help 
finance purchases by Western Europe of goode and services 
in the Western Hemisphere. Such purchases will, of course, 
greatly exceed the amount of aid provided by the United 
States, and the balance will be financed from exports of goods 
and services by Western Europe, from aid extended by other 
nations in t he Western Hemispherer, and from the use by the 
Western European nations of their national' e holdings of 
dollar assets and of their own gold reserves. 
c. Forms of Assistance. - The Assistance Program frankly 
recognizes that a l ar ge part of the aid to be extended by 
the United States must be in the form of grants rather dollar 
loans. Whether assistance will be given through grants upon 
payment of cash, upon credit terms, or other methods of pay-
:metit -' .~a; ·t6-:.,be.:~d"e-c1ded':.~y "1m:e ··J\dm1:ni.strator· Tol'1 Ec»nomic 
Cooperati on in consultation with the National Advisory Council. 
1. Felix Belair Jr., "Congress Votes A Historic Pro-
~", P.E.%, The New York Times, April 4, 1948. 
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The decision in each case will be based upon the character and 
purpose of the assistance, and the capacity of the recipient 
nations to make repayment, V~enever assistance takes the form 
of dollar loans, the loans are to be extended by the Export-
Import Bank with funds provided by the Administrator, The 
Act apparently envisages that during the first year of the 
recover,Y progrm dollar loans will total about 1 billion 
dollars, and grants and other forms of aid, about 4.3 billion 
dollars. Preliminary estimates by the Executive Branch 
indicate~: that of the first year's authorization of about 
3.8 billion will go for so-called relief type commodities · 
such as food, fuel, fibers and fertilizers. The remaining 
1.5 billion dollars would be devoted to recovery type equip-
1 
ment, materials and services, 
d. Supervision over Aid, - . The legislation sets up an 
Economic Cooperation Administration. The Administrator, 
himself, is to review and appraise the requirements of the 
participating countries, to formulate programs for the u.s. 
Assistance, to proYide for the efficient execution of such 
programs, and to terminate provision of assistance. The 
Administrator is to consult on general or basic policy matters 
with a ~blic Advisory Board of not more than twelve members, 
~ appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, The Administrator is to be represented abroad 
1. Op,Cit., Felix Belair Jr,, p,l5 
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by a special representative who will co-ordinate the work of 
the economic missions to be set to each participating coun-
try. and who will be the chief representative Qf the United 
States Government to any organization of participating coun-
tries which may be established by sueh countries to further 
1 
a joint program for European recovery, 
The Secretary of State, after consultation w1 th 
the Administrator is authorized to conclude agreements in 
f'Drtherance of the purposes of the Act w1 th individual parti-
cipating countries, or with any number of sueh countries, 
or with an organization representing all participating 
countries to the fullest possible individual and joint action 
in achieving economic recovery. The Administrator is directed 
to terminate a ssistance Whenever he finds that a participating 
country is not adhering toits agreement, or that assistance 
is no longer consistant with the national interest of the 
2 
United States. 
In order that Congress may follow the execution of 
the program, a JointCommittee on Foreign Economic Cooperation 
bas been established consisting of five Senators and five 
Representatives, In addition, the President is to transmit 
to congress at leas t once a quarter a report of all operation 
3 
und-er the Aot, 
1·, ep,cat,, ww Aldrich, 
2, Ibid,. 
3. ~. 
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In being geared to the needs of all Western Europe, in frankly 
racing the obvious truth that much ef' the aid must take the 
form of' grants, and 1n providing What is though to be ade-
quate supervisory machinery, the Marshall Program, as trans-
lated into law, has decided advantages over previous methods 
of granting assistance to Western Europe. We believe these 
advantages will contribute greatly to its probable success. 
CHAPTER II 
SELLING UNDER THE MARSHALL PLAN 
Under the Economic Assistant Act of 1948, the 
United States is granting billions in dollar credits to 
the Marshall Plan countries so that they can buy the goods, 
raw materials, equipment and services needed to stimulate 
the recovery of the war-crippled economy of Western Europe. 
This recovery program has distinct characteristics 
different from t he aids and relieves rendered by the United 
Sta tea previously. The United Sta tee is providing dollar·, 
credits - not money itself - to the Western European nations 
for recovery. The United States, through the Economic 
Cooperation Administration, pays the bills after authorized 
purchases are made• The citizens in the Western European 
nation.s who receive American products under~: t he Marshall 
Plan do not get them free. The aid is free to the nations 
but not to the individuals. They pay their own governments 
for the purchases in their ow.n currencies, amd these "counter-
part• funds are then used on projects approved by the ECA 
which will further economic recovery. Thus American dollars 
are doing "double duty" toward rebuilding Europe. 
Secondly, the ECA does not buy or sell, book 
cargoes, route shipments Gr engage in any other phase of 
actual buying-selling operations. The ECA serves as the 
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banker for buyers and sellers,making sure that the invest- I.! 
mente in the economic recovery ot Western Europe are on the 
e soundest possible basis to yield the greatest returns in 
world peace and prosperity, not only for Europe but for 
this country as well. 
Transactions under European Recovery Program follow 
the general practice of utilizing private channels of trade 
wher~ver possible. As tar as the American exporters are 
concerned, they go after the business in the same manner 
that they pursued their normal export-import trade before 
the war. They negotiate contracts directly with their custo-
mers, taking the same precautions with respect to terms and 
conditions of delivery and payment as they would if financing 
was not being provided by the ECA. 
As this program gives some additional 5 billion 
' dollars yearly purchasing power to the Western Europeans 
for buying American goods, it is naturally ot vital interest 
to the American farmers, industrialists, workers and business-
men as well. In view of the gigantic sums involved in this 
program and the importance of this program to the American 
businessmen, it is necessary for the American businessmen 
to understand some basic operation. pro.~edures of the EDropean. 
Recovery Program. 
I A • . Opera.tion Prodedures of European Recovery Program 
f l 
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The detail operation procedures of ERP invol~~ 
a lengthy volume and a great deal of complexity. It is im-
practicable to be embodied in this book. However, the 
general procedures a.re w.~ll illustrated by :five charts presen-
ted by ECA as on the following pages • 
. , 
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Explaining in a brief sense, as the customers or 
importers, the businessmen of the Marshall Plan nations, 
through their governments, estimate their needs for their 
annual recovery programs and ask the ECA for dollar financing. 
After review and approval of the programs by the ECA in the 
combined needs of all participants, the ECA i nforms the coun-
tries as to how many dollars may be used to finance purchases 
of commodities and services. The countries then submit 
requests to the ECA for "Procurement Authorizations" to be 
i as·ued against these funds. Approved procurement authoriza-
tions are then granted on broad commodity classifications 
( Such as "Construction and Mining Equipment") because of the 
inability ~f the Eruopean businessmen to predict so far in 
advance the exact goods they will need. 
Each Procurement Authorization will bear a Pro-
curement Authorizat1on number and the issuance of the Pro-
curement Authorization will constitute authority to the 
participating country to use the Procurement Authorizaion 
number in placing orders in accordance with the terms of the 
Procurement Authorization. The Procurement Authorizaion 
number ldll indicate the participating country to which 
the authorization is given, the commodity code, the source 
from which the materials are to be obtained, and the delivery 
period to which the Procurement Authorizaion refers. 
After receiving the Procurement Authorizations, 
I the businessmen in the participating countries may then 
contract for thousands of related items which fall under the 
general commodity classification through the sub-authoriza-
~ions granted by their respective government. The ECA 
generally does not know in advance exactly what these thousands I 
of items are or by whom they. are going to be purchased be- II 
cause keeping track of each individual purchase would greatly 
delay the recovery program and require a tremendous staff. 
After the sub-authorizations are issued, the cue-
tomers proceed to negotiate for their purchases with salesmen 
of their own choice through normal trade channels, searching 
for the most satisfactory products at the most satisfactory 
prices. They pass along to the suppliers or the salesmen 
the basic information concerning documentation required and 
any special conditions imposed by the terms of authorization. 
The United States businessmen enter the picture 
when Procurement Authorizationsare approved by the ECA. 
The authorizations usually approved in advance or 
contracting and delivery dates, serve the salesmen as a 
lead on what Marshall Plan customers are authorized and 
plan to buy. This information is made available by the ECA 
as quickly and completely as possible, t hrough press releases, 
Department of Commerce field offices, trade journals and 
other similar sources. 
Congress in April 1949 directed that "!n sofar 
p~actioable . . .... the ECA "•·•• shall assist American small 
business to partiqipa~e equitably in the furnishing of 
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I 
commodities and services ••••• by making available ,,,, to 
suppliers 1n the United States, and particularly to small 
independent enterprises, information, as far in advance as 
I I possible, w1 th res·pect to purchases •• , , 
1 
available •••• to prospective purchasers in the participating 
and by making 
countries information as to commodities and services produced 
by small independent enterprises in the United States, and 
by otherwise helping to give small business an opportunity 
to participate in the furnishing of commodities and services 
financed " • • • • 
Efforts by which the intent of Congress may be 
1 
carried out are now receiving intensive study, 
As dissussed before, the United States businessmen 
or suppliers go after the business in the same manner, bhat 
they pursue their normal export-import trade, however, there 
are several special conditions to be noted in handling ECA 
shipments. 
B, Special Conditions to be Met in Handling ECA Shipments 
a. Use of Procurement Authorization Number •. . - Each 
importer to whom a sub-authorization has been made by his 
government must inform his supplier that the transaction is 
to be financed by ECA, and must give to his supplier the 
Procurement Authorization Number· that has been ~ven to 
him, The importer must also inform his SUPPlier of any 
special provisions which affect the supplier in carrying out 
1, Op,Cit,, Information for Am, Businessmen on the 
-Marshall~~an.-
~5 
the transaction. 
The supplier must put the Procurement Authorization 
l 
numver on all documents required tor re-imbursement. 
b. Delivery. - Any order placed by an importer must 
be for delivery within the quarter specified by the sub-
authorization from his government. A supplier~ must not 
accept an order identified by a Procrement Authorization 
number for a quarter in which he has not promised delivery . 
If a supplier has accepted, in good faith, an 
order for delivery in a designated quarter, he may in agree-
ment with the importer, make delivery not more than 60 days 
i n advance of the beginning of that quarter, and not more 
'I that 90 days after the end of the quarter, except where de-
l livery is otherwise restricted 1n the Procurement Authoriza-
1 I tion and subject to export control exercised by the United 
I Stat es Depar~ment of Commerce. If it later develops that 
delivery cannot be made within this period, the supplier 
must promptly notify the importer who must in turn obtain 
I 
from his government a Procurement Authorization number ap-
2 
plicable to the new delivery date. 
c. Marking Requirements. - Commodities furnished under 
the act will be stamped, tagged, stenei~ed or labelled with 
the official ECA emblem, bearing -the t ext "Fbr European 
Recovery, Supplied by the United States of America" translated 
l. 
2. ~. 
r 
into the language of the receip.ient country; sample of Emblem 
and translations may be obtained from ECA Washington, D.C. 
If it is not practicable to mark the commodities 
t hemselves in such manner, the containers in which t he com-
modities are packaged will be s o mar ked. The shipping con-
tainers, whether boxes, cases, barrels, drums, hog-shead 
or of other types, will also bear the official ECA emblem. 
The size of ECA emblem may vary depending upon the size of 
the commodity, package, or shipping container to be marked. 
In additi on, the shipping containers will be stamped, branded, 
stenciled or labelled as follows:-
ECA 
------------------------------(Procurement Authorization # ) 
( Participati ng Country) 
( Shipper!·s Mark) 
Any raw materials ~including coal, grain and 
petroleum, oil and lubricants) not shipped 1n containers; 
fibres packaged in bales ; and metal and lumber mill products 
of a semi-finished nature which are not packaged or crated 
are excepted from these marking requirements. If compliance 
with t he provisions of this section is round to be impractical 
with respect to other r commodities, the participating country 
will promptly reques t ECA, Washington, D.c., t'or an exemption 
1 
from the requirement of this section. 
1. Ibid. 
I 
II 
I 
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d. Insurance. - Dollar payments of premiums for ocean 
.. 
marine insurance on ECA- financed commodities procured in 
4lt the United States will be eligible for financing by ECA 
under a commodity Procurement Authorization, where such 
insurance is placed on a competitive basis in accordance with 
normal trade practices prevailing prior to the outbreak of 
World War II. The supplier, importer or other person placing 
such insurance will notify the insurer that the premiums · 
are to be financed by ECA, and shall furnish the: Procurement 
Authorization number to t~e insurer. If such premiums are 
financed by ECA and an insurable loss is suffered by the 
insured, EGA will request repayment from the participating 
country of a dollar amount equivalent to the insurance 
proceeds r ecovered by the insured. 
Upon aettlemen1i of a claim on account of insurance 
financed by ECA, the insurer shall immediately give written 
notice to the Controller, ECA, Washington, D.c., indicating 
the Procurement Authorization number, the name and address 
1 
of the insured, and the amount of the insurance recovered. 
e. Export Licences. - \~ere procurement is effected 
in the United States for any commodity covered by a Pro-
curement Authorization, export licences must be obtained 
from the United States Department of Commerce. All exports 
from the United States of commodities furnished under the 
Act are subject to such export quotas as may be established 
1. ~. 
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and such export license control as may be exercised by the 
United States Department of Commerce. 
f. Price Limitation. - ECA wil~ not make reimbursement 
dire ctly to a participating country for the purchase in 
bulk of any commodities at prices higher than the market 
prevailing in the United States, nor will ECA make reim-
bursement directly to a participating country for a purchase 
of any commGdity at a price higher than the price calculated 
in accordance with the applicable price provisions in SECTION 
201.22 •• "It is the policy of ECA to make payment only· for 
purchases of commodities, whether or not in bulk, which are 
made at prices that approximate, as nearly as practicable, 
lowest competitive market prices . It is expected that buyers 
exercising prudence in their negotiations,w1ll agree to pay 
no more than such prices ... 
g. Commissions. - No commission paid or to be paid 
to an agent, broker or other representative of an importer 
will be eligible for reimbursement. 
A eo¢mmission paid or to be paid to any agent, 
broker or other representative of a supplier is not pro-
hibited and will be eligible for ~eimbursement. Subsequent 
to reimbursement, however; the Administrator will r~quest 
repayment from the importing country of the amount of suCh 
commission unless it is payable to a selling agent ( 1~) who 
is an individual both a citizen and resident of the United 
States, or a partnership composed exclusively under the laws 
of the U~ited States, any state, territory or possession 
thereof, or the District of ~olumbia; and (ii) Who is re-
gularly doing business with the United States, and is not 
acting for, nor representing nor beneficially controlled 
by nor substantially beneficially owned by, a non-citizen 
l 
or non-citizens of the United States. 
h. Airmail Distribution of Ocean Bills of Lading. -
The participating country will instruct importers to advise 
shippers to airmail at the time of loading one copy (or 
photostat) of ocean or charter party bill of lading or 
airway bill to the controller, ECA Mission, American Em-
bassy in the capital city of the participating country re-
2 
ceiving the shipment. 
C • Financing By ECA 
As the banker, the ECA, in addition to its review, 
consolidation and approval of the procurement programs of 
all participating countries, sees that the prices padd for 
commodities and services purchased with Marshall Plan dollars 
are not in excess of the normal market price for that parti-
cular commodity. 
a• Types of Reimbursement. - The ECA, who pays the bills 
after the goods are dell vered, utili·zes four reimbursement 
methods. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
II 
I 
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i. Reimbursement to a Marshall Plan country Which has 
used its own dollars initially to pay for purchases. 
I ii. Letter of Commitment issued by the ECA to a 
I 
US bank against an individual procurement authorization for 
the commodities or services covered therein and subject 
II 
to the terms and conditions of the authorization. The letters 
of credit against the letter of commitment are arranged by 
the purchaser. 
against the letters of credit. The ECA then reimburses the 
bank. 
involving complicated terms or advance and progress payments. 11 
iv. A revolving fund account which the teA establishes 11 
II for a country on the books of the Treasury Department. 
The country may draw drafts on the ECA against this account 
l 
in order to make payment to suppliers. 
b. Documents required for reimbursement. - Claims for 
reimbursement on ECA shipments must be supported by the followi~ II 
documents:-
i. Voucher SF-lo34 {revised in original and three 
copies, to be prepared by the supplier of the assignee where 
Letter a£ Commitment is issued by ECA to the supplier; or 
1. Ibid. 
in 6~er eases, by the participating country,. by the approved 
applicant, or by .the banking institu~lon as assignee, or 
1 
as agent for and in behalf of the approved applicant •. 
ii. Supplier's Certificate, in duplicate, with invoice 
and contract abstract on reverse side. 
iii. One copy (or photostat).' of ocean or charter party 
bill of lading, or airway bill, or parcel post receipt. 
iv. one copy(or photostat) of supplier's detailed 
invoice showing quantity, description, gross sales price, 
net sales price (after deducting all discounts and purchasing 
agents' commission applicable) and basis of delivery (e.g~ 
f' . o.b. vessel, r.a.s) of the commodities or services, and 
e i ther (i) marked "paid" by the supplier or:.- (ii) endorsed 
by or accompanied by a certificate of, an officer of a 
banking institution indicating that payment has been made 
in the amount shown on the invoice. 
v. Such aditional documentation as may be required 
for reimbursement by endorsement upon the procurement 
authorization. 
1. Ibid 
2. Ibid 
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CHAPTER III 
EGA ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE DURING THE FIRST 18 
MONTHS AND PROGRESS OF THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY 
PROGRAM 
The f irst eighteen months or ECA assistance to 
Europe marked a papid economic advance in Western Europe~ 
Industrial production and export trade rose substantially, 
and the tide or inflation was generally halted under the 
impetus of the self-help and mutual aid programs of the 
participating countries and assistance furnished ~Y the 
United States. 
In the period of eighteen months, from April 1948 
to September 1949, $7,085,700,000 were made available for 
aid to the nations participating in the European Recovery 
program. Of this total, $6,976,000,000 were previded as 
grants or loans to finance essential purchases of the ERP 
countries, including shipping costs and technical services. 
1 
More than two-thirds of the supplies financed by 
ECA during the period were scheduled for purchase in the 
United States, and most of the remainder in Canada and Latin 
2 
America. 
The allotments, issued every quarten· to the parti-
cipating countries, set the ceiling on procurement that 
1. Economic Cooperation Ad.minis tra tion,_ {S_th Report 
to Congress, for the Quarter Ended Set.30, 1949, Superi·n-
=====tt~~nde:nj;.___Qt Docament.s..,_JL.S.Gov't Pr1n:t.1n 0 e Washi~on B C 
2. ~., p.ll4 5. 
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might be authorized during that period. Allotments issued 
by type "of aid for the eighteen month period ended Sept.30, 
1949, are shown in the following table:-
1 
TABLE II 
ALLOTMENTS TO PARTICIPATING COU1~RIES 
BY TYPE OF AID, APRIL 1948-SEPT.1949 
. (million of -dollars) 
April -April 1948 to 
1948 June 1949 
to 
Country Sept. Total Direct Condi- Loans 
1949 Grants _tional 
Aid 
Total 7086 5953 4209 771 972 
United States •••••• 1912 1620 963 334 323 
France •••••• 1527 1313 1132 10 172 
Italy •••••• 792 668 554 47 67 Western Germany ••• 722 614, 516 97 Netherlands • •• • • • • 653 571 413 11 146 Belgium-Luxembourg •• 361 261 3 207 51 
Austria •••••• 333 280 277 3 Greece •••••• 241 192 192 Denmark • • • • • • 154 126 90 5 31 Norway •••••• 130 101 ~- , so . 17 35 Ireland 
••••• • 101 86 86 Turk!ey -
•••• • • 
68 49 11 38 Sweden 
•• • ••• 
61 45 25 20 
Trieste •••••• 22 18 18 Iceland 
• • • • • • 11 8 3 4 2 
Jul.y 
to 
Se~t 
19 9 
1133 
292 
214 
124 
108 
82 
99 
53 
50 
28 
29 
14 
19 
15 
4 
2 
Of the total allotments, 20 perc.ent was in the 
form of loans and the balance consisted of conditional aid 
a.nd direct grants. The United Kingdom and France together 
1. Ibid, ECA Repart, p.35. 
'I 
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received 48 percent of the allotments, Italy 11 percent, 
Western Germany 10 percent and the Netherlands about 9 
percent. The remaining 22 percent was divided among ten 
countries - Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Trieste, and Turkey~ 
Allotments to Austria, Greece, Trieste, and 
Western Germany were entirely in the form o~ grants. On 
the other hand, Ireland received its entire allotment in the 
form of a. loan. Assistance to other countries included loans 
as well as grants. The allotments to Turkey and Sweden 
comprised only loans and conditional aid. 
B. Flow·.·of Supplies 
At the end: of September 1949, the Administration . 
had authorized procurement of $6976 million, of Which 31 
percent was for the procurement of food, feed, and fertilizer; 
29 perr cent for raw materials and semi-finished products; 
14 percent for fuel; 14 per 1· cent for machinery and vehicles. 
Other products - - mostly tobacco- made up the remaining per-
1 
centage. 
GOods and services valued at $5188,400,000 or about 
three-fourths of approved procurements were actually shipped 
and paid for through September 1949. The following graphs 
show the flow of supplies of EOA procurements. 
1. ~' EOA Report, pp.ll0-111. Table ::0-2. 
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GRAPH VI 
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a. Food, reed and fertilizer. _- From the beginning or 
the ECA program through September 30, 1949, authorizations 
for rood, feed, and fertilizer totalled $2,157,000,000. 
Bread Grains continued to be the principal foodsturf pro-
vided the European nations, lli th over two thirds of the? 
amount authorized shipped to the United Kingdom. Fats and 
oils were second in importance and were mainly purchased 
by the Bizone, the Netherlands and France. 
Shipments for food, reed~ and fertilizer have 
been relatively prompt - almost rour-rirths of the items 
approved for :,;procurement were moved, varying from about . 
. 1 
90 percent for bread grains to 4o per . cent for seeds. 
br. ~. - Authorizations for the purchase of petro-
leum and coal were one-seventh of all commodity authorizations. 
However, authorizations for coal fell off gradually. Produe-
1 tion in ERP nations has generally caught up with demand ex- I 
cept for special purpose coals~ I In addition, Poland is sending 
about half its coal exports to Western Europe, thus effect 
in important savings in dollars by the recdpient countries. 
Despite increased availabilities, however, there is a scarcity 
of gas and coking coals in Europe. Requirements for United 
2 
States coal consist mainly of these types. 
Almost 1 billion dOllars worth of fuel had been 
financed by ECA in 18 months, with nearly three-fourths of 
1. Ibid., p.37 
2. !bid., p.37 to p.38 l 
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. this sum allocated to petroleum and petroleum products. A~ 
the end of the last quarter, 80 percent of p&troleum and 
petroleum products and 94 per cent of coal purchases author-
i~ed had been shipped. 
c. Haw materials and semi-finished products. p. -~. 4uthor.i­
zati ons for raw matei!ials and semi-finished products --
chiefly cotton, non-ferrous metals and chemicals -- in the 
eighteen month-period brought approvals to $2 billion. 
The United King~om was the major recipient of 
cotton and non-f~rrous metals approved for ECA financing. 
Italy was authorized to purchase substantial quantities of 
. 1 
cotton and fabricated basic textiles. 
Through the end of the quarter, ECA had financed 
$667 million worth of cotton - over 99 percent from the 
United States - as well §S $440.2 million worth of non-ferrous 
metals and $202.7 million worth of iron and steel mill ma-
2 
terials and products. 
Payment data cshow that 82 percent of the non-fer~oua 
metals, 70 percent of cotton and 64 percent of iron and 
steel had been shipped. 
d~ Machinery and vehicles_. - . In 18 months of ECA op-
erations, almost $1 billion worth of these items had been 
financed - w1 th 97 pe:r.cent coming <f'rom · the United Sta tea 
mainly for France, the Netherlands, Italy and the United 
1. ECA 4th Report to Congress, p.42 
!. Op.Cit., ECA 6th Report, p.39 
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Kingdom, reflecting the large volume of industrial projects 
approved. 
About half of the ECA financing will cover pur-
chases to expand steel mill racilities in the United Kingdom, 
France, Austria, and Belgiulll•. ·~ The greater par.t of motor 
vehicle authorizations went to Belgium, the Netherlands and 
l 
France. 
During the first quarter of 1949, machinery can-
cellations amounted to 70 million dollars. The greater 
n 
part of the cancellations was acco~ted for by the United 
Kingdom and the Bizones. Most of Bizone cancellations in-
volved railroad transportation equipment and parts scheduled 
to be purchased from CZechoslovakia and Hungary which will 
be obtained under trade agreements rather than with ECA 
financing. The United Kingdom's machinery cancellations 
were due largely to adjustments in procurement programs 
2 
pending approval of industrial projects. 
Because of the normal lag that occurs between 
the placing or order.s .for capital equipment items and their 
manuraeture~ only 45 percent or approved machinery and ve-
hicle items had been paid .for. 
e<i Other cProducts. - Tobacco took up 75 pePeent o.f all 
these items. The .financing o.f tobacco purchases reached 
249 million dollars. The United Kingdom \~S the principal 
1. Ibid., ECA 6th Report., p. 39 
2. Op.Cit., ECA 4th Report, p.42-44. 
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recipient. 
~. ShipPing Services. - By September;:o 30, 1949, ECA had 
approved the use of 550 million dollars ocean freight ser-vices. 
c. Procurement Trends 
The graph below shows the procurement trends for 
major commodity groups:-
60 
3·,.._ __ 
GRAPH VII 
PROCUREMENT TRENDS 
(Percentage o~ All Commodities:) 
Fuel 
~ 
- / ---~-0 ·~------~-----------==-----~--------~-------iwl--~~·-Y.~ft--·------' 
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The graph on the preceeding page indicates that 
the portion of ECA funds going for machinery and vehicles 
has been rising while that of foodstuffs and fuel has been 
dropping. The increasing trends of importing machinery and 
vehicles, and raw materials reflect the gradual expansion 
and improvement of European industries. On the other hand, 
the steady decline in consumption of American food and fuel 
explains the self-sufficiency of these items in Europe. 
D. Industrial Projects 
A projects procedure to facilitate the screening 
and analysis of large-scale undertakings which constitute imp-
ortant segments of the industrial investment programs of the 
participating countries was established by the ECA in Novem-
ber 1948. r ·n addition to permitting a review of the project 
as a whole, rather than piece-meal examination of requests 
for financing purchases of the many materials and pieces of 
equipment required, the procedure makes possible an evalua-
tion of the undertaking in the light of the investment pro-
grams of the applicant country and of other nations. 
An applicant country must present economic justi-
fication for each project as part of its recovery and invest-
ment program. A statement must also be sub~tted detailing 
the required materials, source of procurement, and the nature 
and source of funds to be employed. The OEEC considers 
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the proposed projects, either individually or as part o~ a 
program, and the country missions and O~fice of the Special 
Representative are required to submit recommendations. Final 
approval or denial rests ~dth the Projects Committee in 
1 
EGA-Washington. 
Projects approved through the 3rd quarter of 1949 
are as follows:-
GRAPH VIII 
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS APFROVED BY EGA 
. through Sept. 1949 , 
In Millions of Dollars-
including ECA dollars, 
other dollars, and 
dollar equivalents of 
loeal currencies 
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GRAPH IX 
TYPE 'OF ' INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS 
(approvals through Sept.30, 1949) 
Millions ::o:r Dollars 
Type of Projects 
.. 
~-·--·-~~.-------------~b - ~00 - 200 . ~- r 1 -::::;;::: 
Iron & Steel Mfg. ~· ·?~.s~~ ·._, ·. ::/.1-ut:.ner· Cost _j- ___.465 
Petroleum Rfng ... 1. ;-- T- ·;...- ~ 
~- -- I 
I q !i I Potash Mining •• • w.' . _____ T__j 
Power Facilities •• ,2 . ...,:::-:-.:.L;;j _ ----!.1 1 
! . 
~ I : 
···s--. 
••• :L_J 
Roads ••••• 
Coal Min~ng 
I Automotive Mfg •••••• ,.- ~ 1 
1 Others ••••• 
r . 
* Includes EGA dollars, other dollars, and dollar equi-
valents of local currencies. 
1 • .!12!.9:, EGA 6th Report, p.4o 
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A total of 56 industrial projects were approved 
by ECA up to September 1949. This brought to ECA oommit-
ments .of 264 million dollars for enterprises that will require 
the equivalent of $1,263 million to finance, including local 
currencies, free dollars, dollars borrowed from the Export 
Import Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, and drawing rifhts. France is taking pro-
jects valued at $425 million (including $91 million allocated 
by ECA) and the United Kingdom $410 million ( $47 million 
from ECA). 
Nearly three-fourths of' the ECA dollars involved 
were earmarked· f'or the modernization and expansion o~ manu-
f'acturing facilities -- the bulk for iron and steel plants. 
Another 18 per cent was allocated for the rehabilitation and 
expansion of transportation, communication, and utility faci-
lities -- principally for power installation -- and nearly 
all -of the remaining 9 percent for raw material extraction. 
E. Locan Currency Counterpart Funds 
ECA has two major objectives in considering the 
use to which counterpart funds are put by the participating 
countries - first, helping the governments to maintain fl-
., _____ 
nancial stability without Which economi~~ recovery cannot be 
achieved, and second, promotion of productive investments~ 
The employment of counterpart to retire government debt, 
primarily by the United' Kindom and Norway, has helped these 
\ 
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countries to maintain or achieve fiscal stability. Counter-
part funds have also provided an important source of financ-
ing for investment programs in Austria., France, Western 
Germany, Greece, Italy and Trieste. 
1 
GRAPH IX 
STATUS OF ERP COUNTERPART FUNDS 
(ECA Aid througg September 1949 will produce the 
equiyalent of $4.5 billion in local currency) 
Billions 
5 ,~··--·--~----------------------------~ 
CUMULATIVE 
4 (Dollars and Dollar Equivalents) 
!---------·-··· -···------··--- --·-----·---
Grant Aid 
31-----··-
le Ib~d, ECA 6th Report, p.46 
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GRAPH X 
ERP COUNTERPART FUNDS*PROGRAM APPROVALS 
(September 30, 1949) 
($3.1 billion of counterpart funds wer approved for 
country use-over 90% for monetary and financial 
stabilization and promotion of production) 
-·--·-·-- fn Millions of dollars 
France -: •••••• 
U.K. • ••••• 
.Italy • • • • ••• • 
Austria .-.: .•• ••• 
W.Germany •• •• 
Greece ••• ••• 
Netherlands ••• 
Norway ••• • • • 
Trieste I I I 
I 
-~----' 
France. - EOA has been releasing French counterpart 
on a monthly basis after reviewing the financial situation 
to determine whether such funds should be channeled into 
investment projects or used for monetary stabilization. 
The need · for a large investment program.· in France has been 
urgent, since delay in .the development of basic industries . 
1. Ibid., ECA 6th Report, p.49 
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might bring economic stagnation. Emplo$IDent of counterpart 
! 
J .. 
in the French investment program, approved by OEEC, is de-
pendent upon the maintenance of financial stability. Measures 
taken by the French Government, such as credit control, 
control of profits, limitations on budgetary expenditures, 
and· wage stabilization were succes~ful in reducing infationary 
pressure. As a result, 80 percent of ~he counterpart With-
drawals approved during the period was earmarked for invest-
ment in productive enterp~ises and ao percent for monetary 
stabilization. 
Counterpart funds have been used to finance the 
modernization and equipment of key sectors of the French 
economy, including the coals, mines, steel industry, hydro-
electric power production, agricultural expansion, restoration I 
of the ~erchant and fishing fleets, and development of resourcef 
in French overseas territories. By the end of September, 
206 billion francs had been ·withdrawn under this program, 
including advance of 30 billion francs in August to maintain 
the tempo of investments at a time when ordinary revenues 
were insufficient to cover the non-counterpart share of the 
1 
investment program. 
United -.Kingdom. - Retirement of the Government's 
internal debt ~s an anti-inflationary measure was the main 
use of counterpart funds in the United Kingdom. Through 
September ~183 million (equivalent to 739 million dollars) 
1. ~., ECA 6th Report, p.47 
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had been withdrawn for debt retirement. 
Western Germany. - With the establishment of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Western Germany) in September 
1949, administration of the special local currency accounts 
in the Bizone and French Zone were merged. 
Counterpart funds in Western Germany were not re-
leased prior to this quarter because of the uncertain fi-
nancial situation following the currency reform. At the 
beginning Of 1949 inflationary pressureswere strong and in-
dustrial production was increasing.- In recent months pro-
duction has leveled off and unemployment has ·risen making 
the use of counterpart necessary for the promotion of pro-
1 
duction. 
Austria. - Through Sept.30, 1949, ECA agreed to 
the withdrawal of 1910 million schillings (equivalent to 
191 million) of Austrian counterpart deposits. Whereas 
the bulk or- the funds released in 1948 (850 billion schillings) 
was used for debt retirement, releases in 1949 have been 
earmarked exclusively for the promotion of production. 
The agricultural program financed with counterpart 
includes drainage of wet lands, irrigation of farming areas 
deficient in water supplies, erosion control measures, and 
construction of roads in inaccessible farming localities. 
Industrial projects include the building of power plants 
~nd dams along the Enns River, in the Tauern Valley, and 
1. Ibid., ECA 6th Report, pp.48-50 
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the Kaprun. The Kaprun hydroelectric plant is designated 
to produce 600 million kilowatt hours of electricity per 
year when completed. Other investments include the cons-
truction of the first zinc smelter in Austria to enable do-
mestic ores to be worked in the country. The railroad re-
construction program covers repairs to war-damaged equipment, 
roadways, and bridges, and purchase of new rolling stock 
l 
and other .. equipment. 
Norway. - In view of the large investment program 
financed by the Norwegian Government from its own resources, 
ECA has agreed to the use of counter part exclusively for 
debt retirement as a meansof reducing inflationary pressures 
and stimulating economic recovery. The total utilized for 
this purpose since the inception of the Marshall Plan is 
2 
365 Kroner. 
Italy. - The large part o:f the wi.thdrawals of Italy's 
counterpart were for agricultural development. 
F. Progress of European Recovery Program 
In authorizing assistance to the participating 
countries, the United States Congress outlined three major 
elements of the joint recovery program: 
1. Promotion o:f industrial and agricultural production 
in the participating countries; 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
II 
I 
I 
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2. Furthering the restoration or maintenance Qf the 
soundness of European currencies, budgets, and finances; and 
3. Facilitating and stimulating the growth of internation-
al trade of the participating countries with one another 
and with other countries by appropriate measures, including 
the reduction of barriers which may hamper such trade. 
In each of these fields, the na tiona of \'{estern 
Europe made substantial progress in the first eighteen months 
of the European Recovery Program. The outstanding achieve-
ment was the rapid advance of industrial production. ~ in-
creased supplies of fue~ and raw materials and accelerated 
reconstruction of industrial plants facilitated extensive 
gains in output throughout Western Europe. While employ-
ment rose somewhat during the period, most of the increase 
in production was attributable to greater output per worker. 
Progress during the eighteen months brought the 
level 6f industrial output in the participating countries up 
to 15 per cent above the prewar period, roughly half way 
along the road to the long term production goal. The national 
programs of the ERP countries envisages an increase of in-
dustrial production by nearly a third during the four-year 
period of the ERP if the nations were to meet the needs of 
a population 10 percent larger than before the war, make good 
the wartime destruction and depreciation of plants and 
equipment, and provide the much grea~er volume of exports 
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needed to finance essential imports. 
Agricul~ural production in 1948 and the first six 
months of i949 far exceeded the rate of preceding year mainly 
because of more favorable weather, but output of most crops 
still below the prewar leyels. As the recovery program has 
gone forward, the broader .application of fertilizers, use of 
improved seeds and greater use of farm machinery have pro-
vided the basis ~or an expansion of agricultural improvement. 
The recovery program witnessed substantial improve-
ment in the internal financial situation of the participating 
countries. In the first quarter. of 1949 and onward, whole ... 
saie prices were generally stable or declined slightly in 
all the major countries, expansion of money supply was vir-
tually checked. Most governmental budgets were either 
balanced or approaching a balance, and the remaining deficits 
were covered largely from non-inflationary sources. 
a. Industrial Production. -
The overall industrial production of the ERP nations 
during the year 1949 was about .l5 percent above than prewar 
(1938) and also about 15 percent over the 1948 level. At 
the end of September, excluding production in Western Germany, 
industrial output was about 10 percent above a year earlier 
and 27 percent above the prewar average. Production in 
Western Germany made the most outstanding gain during 1948 
and 1949, but still remained substantially below the 1936 
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level. 
Germany 
The largest gain were recorded by Austria and 
countries furthest behind in the race to expand 
output - - and the smallest by Belgium, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and Denmark -- the countries furthest along. 
The progress recorded by the principal participants 
in expanding industrial output since the beginning of the 
ERP and during the third quarter of 1949 is summarized in 
the following tables and graphes: -
J., 
TABLE I II 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, RATE OF EXPANSION 
Indexes ~12:28 -100} ~ change 
124'S 1242 2nd Q. 3rd Q. 
2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 1949 1949 
II 
II 
Qtr Qtr Qtr . _Qtr fr.2n,d, fr.3rd . 
148 .1 48 , 
Total 103 101 117 112 + 14 t 11 I 
Austria ••• •••• 75 77 99 n.a. f 32 n.a • I Belgium ••• •••• 114 113 119 n.a. t 4 n.a • Denmark ••• •••• 132 124 132 132 0 4 6 France • • • •••• 115 103 129 113 "f' 12 +10 Bizone of Germany ... ' 43 56 73 77 ~70 .f 37 
Greece ••• •••• 71 77 90 95 + 27 + 23 
Ireland ••• • • •• 138 132 144 n.a. t 4 n.a • Italy ••• •••• 98 102 108 106 t 10 t 4 Netherland ••• • • • • 110 113 121 125 -t 10 .fll Norway • • • • • • • 133 110 138 115 -t 4 t 5 Swedent ••• • • • • 143 143 146 144 t 2 + 1 United Kingdom • • • • 128 121 137 128 t7 + 6 
1. ~. p.l3. 
I 
I' 
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1. ECA 6th Report, p.15. 
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GRAPH XII 
KEY INDICATORS OF EUROPEAN RECOVERY -1938-100 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
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1. Computed based on materials provided by ECA 6th 
Report, Tables Bl-B5, pp.98-103. 
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b. Output of Basic Industries.-
(1) Steel. - The uninterrupted expansion in Western 
European steel production since the close of the war con-
tinued through the third quarter of 1949, when about 11,000,000 
metric tons of crude steel were produced -28 percent more 
than in the first quarter• of 1948. The greatest increase 
occurred in Germany, where steel output during 1949 more than 
doubled than the preceding year. Exclusive of Western Germany, 
production in the remaining ERP countries was about 18 percent 
above the first quarter of 1948. The United Kingdom was pro-
ducing steel at an annual rate of 15,800,000 metric tone as 
compared with the revised program of 16,000,000 metric tons 
for 1949-50 and 17,000,000 metric tons for 1952 to 53. French 
steel output was estimated at 9,600,000 tons for 1949 set a 
1 
postwar record. This level had not been attained since 1929. 
('2) Coa.l~ - According to the rate of production, 
through the third quarter of 1949, the annual output of coal 
for 1949 would be 420,000,000 metric tons - a gain of 10 per 
cent in a year - to approximately 90 per cent of 1938 • . 
Bri~sh coal output was up 8 per cent, French 7 per 
cent and Belgium 17 pep cent over last year. Failure of ag-
gregate production to return to the prewar rate is due to 
the lAS of German output, which was still about 25 to 30 per 
cent .lese than prewar, although substantially higher than 
1. Ibid., p.l4. 
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a year earlier. Exclusive of Germany, the Western European 
coal industry was back to 1938 level of production. 
(3) Electric Power. - The supply of electricity was 
about 50 per cent greater than the 1938 rate~ This increased 
supply of energy is a major factor in the expansion of indus-
trial output, but Western Europe needs much greater capacity 
if it is to effect the }mprovement in productivity env~~aged 
in the long term programs of the countries. Plans are under 
v1ay for a considerable expansion of capacity in France, Germany 
Austria, and other countries. 
( 4) Textiles. - The textile industries kept pace l'li th 
the fieneral upswing of industrial production in 1949. Yarn 
-·-production, the basic indicator of activity in textile manu-
facture was about 18 percent greater than a year ago and within 
2 percent of prewar. German textile production has made a 
remarkable comeback. 
Changes in output relative prewar varied consider-
ably for the three fibers, - rayon, wool, and cotton~ The 
greatest advance was made by the rayon yarn industry, in which 
output was 64 percent ~1gher than before the war. Out-put 
of wool ya.rn:•also exceeded the prewar rate, but cotton · yarn 
1 
production still lagged 90nsiderably behind. 
c. EmploiJ!len1; in ERP Nations. - The labor force ws.s nearly 
1
1 
fully employed in all the European countries throughout 1949 
except Italy, Western Germany, Belgium and Greece. In most 
76 
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other countries, the number of unemployed constituted less 
1 
than 2 percent of the labor force. 
d. Agricultural Production 
Cereal crop out-turns in the ERP countries during I 
the June-September quarter confirmed and, in many cases surpass~d 
early estimates. With the exception of Turkey, the reported I 
yield per. acre of bread and feed grains equaled or exceeded 
those of the 1948 crop year, despite rainfall that was far 
below average. Precipitation that came at critical moments 
in crop development, combined with substantially increased 
applications of fertilizer, was largely responsible for the 
above average yield of cereal crops. \Vheat and coarse grain 
production from 1949 crops is estimated at about 95 percent of 
prewar -- the same as in 1948. 
With more adequate supplies of feedstuffs available, 
hog and poultry numbers continued to expand, thereby assuring 
increased supplies of animal proteins as the animals mature. 
During the third quarter <of 1949, ~og numbers in Denmark re-
turns to the prewar level, and Ireland for the first time in 
nearly a decade resumed the shipment of animal products to 
the United Kingdom. 
The improvement in agricultural output has enabled 
the governments of Western Europe to ease or eliminate the 
remaining restrictions on food consumption. Improvement in 
the diet of the European peoples, both in quantity and quality, 
is also manifest. Average per:~ eapi ta consumption, in terms 
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of calories, shoul approach closely, or even reach the prewar 
level in 1950. While consumption of high-cost quality foods 
. such as meats, dairy products, fats and o~ls, and sugar will 
still be appreciably below prewar, it should be higher in 1950 
than at any time since the early war years. 
Thus, in the second year of the Marshall Plan, agri-
cultural production in the participating countries is at or 
near -the prevmr level, although, owing to population increase, 
1 
some 10 percent below prewar on a per capita basis. 
e. International Trade 
A striking feature of Western Europe's progress in 
the first eighteen month period of the recovery program was 
the subst~ntial expansion of exports and the resultant improve-
ment in the balcne of trade. Combined with the improved earnin 
from shipping, tourists, and other non-commodity sources, this I 
narrowing of the trade deficit brought Western Europe conside~ I 
ably ahead on the path toward self-support. 
The graphs on the following page indicate the deve-
lopment in foreign trade of the ERP nations for the past 
two years. 
1.~., p.l6 
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1938- 100 
1 
GRAPH XIII 
VOLUME OF COMMODITY TRADE ** 
(Measured at 1938 Prices) 
Countries 
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**1938:- Total Imports -5.82 billion dollars 
Total Exports -2.73 billion dollars 
Source: Fro~ a Survey of Economic Situation and Prospects 
of Europe, prepared by the Economic Commission for 
Europe, UN Economic and Social Council, March 1948, 
p.57. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ECA AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 
When the European Recovery Program was undertaken 
in April 1948, supplies of many goode and services were 
acutely short in the United States. Domestic production 
and employment were high. Fear,:·of accentuating the accompany-
ing inflationary pressures through the foreign aid program 
was a main concern. This attitude was reflected in the 
policy of ECA which encouraged purchases from sources out-
side the United States in meeting requ.eete for commpditiee 
from the participating nations. 
Early in 1949 there was a mild recession in some 
sectors of the economy. Total gross national product fell 
by $5 billion in 1949, compared with 1948. From the end of 
1948 to July 1949 industrial production declined by 16 
percent and non-agricultural employment dropped by two 
million. There was no longer the same necessity to safe-
guard United States• supplies. Rather, emphasis was placed 
on the use of surplus commodity stocks wherever needed to 
meet foreign aid requirements. Against this background the 
European Recovery Program, in contributing to the financing 
of exports, incidentally had stabilizing effect on the 
American economy. 
In the year : 1949 as a whole about $4 billion wor'th 
of authorizations was issued to the participating countries 
80 
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for the procurement of commodities and shipping and technical 
services, compared wi~h an annual rate of $6.6 billion in 
the second half of 1948. Significantly, however, the great 
bulk o~ the 1948 authorizations came toward the end of the 
year and their effect in supporting the volume of production 
for export was not felt appreciably until the early part of 
1949. ECA provided $4.3 billion in 1949 (according to balance 
of paymen~data of the Department of Commerce) towards the 
financing of these exports. This amount was equivalent 
to 27 percent of the dollars that all foriegn countries 
used during the year to finance purchases of goods ~d services 
in the ·united States and pay interest and dividends on Am-
1 
erican loans and investments. 
The dollars supplied by ECA to the European countriee 
for procurement outside the United States also helped to 
sustain American exports by enabling the participating coun-
tries to make dollar expenditures in foreign countries, which 
were then permitted to purchase more goods in the United 
States than they could otherwise have done. Payments of 
ECA dollars to Canada and the Latin American countries for 
goods purchased from them by the participating nations was 
the source of funds for significant portion of their 1949 
expenditures in the United States 
2 
and 9 per~ent for Latin America. 
16 percent for Canada 
l. ECA '7th Report to Congress, pp. 59-60 
2. Ibid. 
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Some indication of the impact of the European 
Recovery Program on the American economy can be.'Obtained 
by examining the commodities slated for procurement in the 
United States. Of the ··$2. 7 billion worth of goods .authorized 
during 1949 for procurement in the United States, about 
$1.4 billion comprised food and agricultural items and $1.3 
billion industrial commodities. About half of the total 
authorizations were for cotton, machinery and equipment, and 
wheat and other bread grains. About 90 percent of ECA-fi-
nanced requirements of the participating countries for food 
and agricultural commodities, expept wheat and sugar, was 
purchased in the United States. 
ECA financing accounted for more than half our 
total exports of cotton, toba.cco, and coarse grains to the 
participating countries and the world as a whole. Twenty to 
25 percent of wheat, cotton, and tobacco produced in the 
United States in the year ending June 1949 was purchased by 
the participating count:ti,es, with ECA and other funds. 
Without ECA-finaneed procurement, Government price support 
operations for these commodities would have been substantially 
large. 
The figures presented in the accompanying chart 
may be regarded as broadly significant of the impact of EGA-
financed procurement on United States commodity exports. 
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GRAPH XIV 
IMPACT OF ERP ON UNITED STATES EXPORTS 
Authorizations for Procurement in the United States 
as percent of total United States Exports ••• Jan-Dec.l949 
:It 
-------~f.rilli. n Authorizations as % of exports 
Commodity .. -.Dollaks.-·-~ ---~-- - -~-----·--· --------- ___ _ 2? 50 ~T-7:3.?;:·~:~t~~{:~ ~'t·~01 Cotton 576 
Tobacco 163 
Coarse Grains 165 
Lumber 4$: MFs 43 
Fats & Oils 137 .a.,~ .. ·-~ •• · 
62 p~F(;ffi 
::::~~~ Engines :: ~~~~~~ 
Non- Fer. Metals 
lr~:~:~lti::f' 8) 
Dairy Products 41 G::<;;M;~j~J~~t~\ , 
All Produ=c=t=s==2=7=40==-J~f;~1{~~J[~~;t~;! 
Bread Grains 
-------
Machinery & 
Equipment 
484 
Petrolem & Prod.l25 
Coal 
Other Products 573 l};"rfSj 
75~-
* Procurement authorizations issued in 1949 are not necessarily 
rerlected in exports for the same period. Similarly au-
thorizations issued in 1948, were shipped, in part during 
1949. 
1. Ibid., p.61. 
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A. Agricultural Products. -
· With limited exceptions, ECA authorizations for 
commodities determined to be in surplus supply by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture have been confined to purchases in the 
United States. During the early months of ECA operations, 
many ~gricultural items were not in sufficient supply in 
this country to meet ERP country requirements. Consequently 
a relative large portion of procurement was authorized off-
shore. With the bumper harvests of 1948, the situation was 
appreciably changed and offshor~product purchases were sharplj 
decreased. 
Commodity Credit Corporation stocksexported by 
the Secretary of Agriculture as availble for use by the 
ERF nations are ·-utilized to the extent requirements for them 
are submitted by the participants. In exercising the dis-
cretionary authority, the Secretary of Agriculture has not 
required ECA exclusively to limit procurement by the countries 
to CCC stocks. Such procurement has been relatively small 
compared to total ECA expenditures for food and agricultural 
items. During the period, April 3, 1949 to December 31, 1949 
ECA authorized procurement in the United States of such items 
totaled $2,345 million, of which only $114 million was ob-
tained from Government stocks. 
Most of the agricultural commodities produced in 
the United States, for which the countries submit requests 
are alre~yunder "surplus" determinations. As long as stocks 
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in commercial channels are sufficient to mee,t domestic and 
export requirements, it makes no practical difference whether 
the supplies secured for the participating countries come 
from Government holdings or from those which would be turned 
over to it eventually under price-support programs. Moreover, 
stocks are acquired by the CCC in its price-support programs 
chiefly by purchase or loans to farmers. A commodity might 
be in surplus supply at a given time yet the CCC .would not 
have actual possession of substantial stocks. 
The table on the following page gives the amounts 
of the authorized procurement of surplus agricultural commo-
dities through December 1949. 
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TABLE IV 
AUTHORIZED PROCUREY£NT OF SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL CO~~O­
DITIES FROM THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 3 - Dec.31.1949 
Commodity 
Cotton 
Wheat & Flour 
Tobacco 
Corn 
Cheese 
Peanuts 
Oilcake and Meal 
Flaxseed 
Oats 
Barley 
Wool 
Dried Whole Milk 
Rye 
Wood rosin 
Frozen eggs 
Prunes 
Dried Beans and Peas 
Raisins 
Gum Rosin 
Dried eggs 
Linseed Oil 
Pork 
Gum turpentine 
Tung Oil 
Wood turpentine 
Hemp fiber 
Mohair 
Lecithin 
Flax fiber 
Value ( •ooo,ooo) 
848,0 
740.7 
264.9 
178.1 
63.7 
54.7 
29.2 
26.1 
19.8 
14.8 
11.4 
10.2 
7.4 
7.1 
6.7 
6.3 
6.1 
6.1 
5.5 
5.5 
5.4 
3.4 
2.4 
1,6 
1,4 
.7 
.4 
.2 
.1 
Quantity 
( 'OOO metric 
tons) 
1,113 
8~328 
261 
2,911 
77 
183 
352 
125 
356 
297 
10 
11 
139 
54 
17 
47 
39 
44 
39 
3 
9 
5 
15 
3 
9 
2 
n.a. 
II 
u 
-----
x• Ibid,, p. 63. 
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B • . Manufactured Products.- Large quantities of manufactured 
goods were shipped to ERP countries under the EOA program. 
~ However, there is no evidence whatsoever that we suffered 
a material shortage of such goods. Therefore, in conclusion; 
we may say that the ~ program doesnot impair our econom~, 
but, incidentally has the stabilizing effect to the American 
economy. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
World trade is ,fundamentally out of balance. 
Specifically, the trade of the United States with Western 
' 
Europe, and with the world as a Whole, is so badly unbalanced 
that in our own interest we must seek a fundamental solution 
of this recurring problem.· 
Other countries simply are not earning enough 
dollars to pay for what they import from us. They · have 
"dollar·. shortage". The United States have a vast export 
which we maintain by subsidies at the taxpayer 1 s expense. The 
problem from everyone 1 s point of view is the problem of the 
"dollar gap 11 • 
The foreign assiatance programs such as UNRRA, ci-
vilian relief for occupied territories, and the initial 
phase of ECA have indeed supplied relief, repaired war damage, 
and speeded the process of reconstruction. But it is also 
true that these programs have perpetuated the dollar gap. 
Without these programs, or others like them, the gap would 
by now have been closed - at a low level of trade - through 
inability of other countries to obtain dollars to buy from 
us more than we bought from them. 
It is not suggested that such an outcome would 
have been desirable. On the contrary, these foreign assis-
tance programs have been essential. They have given men 
I' 
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food, hope, and tools; kept free institutions alive; prevented 
chaos. 
But it is time to look beyond salvaging operations. 
The dollar gap, it has now become clear, is a basic inter-
. 
national economic problem. Apart from any reluctance we 
may feel about carrying financial burdens for others indefi-
nitely, our international commitments reflect our desire and 
our considered determination to cooperate with other countries 
in finding real solutions for basic international economic 
problems. Not just stopgaps. 
A. The Dollar :·. Gap in Review 
While the dangerous implications of the dollar 
gap are only now beginning to be fully revealed, the gap has 
a history stretching back some thirty-five years. A brief 
look at that history will help to put the problem in its 
setting. 
From July 1914 through 1948 the United States ex-
ported goods and services to a value of $270 billion and im-
ported goode and services to a value of only $169 billion. 
Thus we exported $101 billion more than we : imported oven 
1 
this period. 
This period witnessed a transformation of the 
world, and a t ransformation, too, of the role of the United 
States Economy in the world. We entered World War I a debtor 
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country and emerged a creditor country. During World War II 
our industrial production outstripped that of' all Europe, 
1 
excluding the USSR. 
The United States export surplus is, of course, 
an import surplus for the rest or the world. As rar as Eur-
ope is concerned, it was generally speaking possible, although, 
increasingly difricult, to balance external accounts through 
the triangular and multilateral system or international 
payments in the years berore World War II. 
The war brought proround changes which upset this 
delicate balance. The story is ramiliar. In the ri r st 
place, Britain and several other European countries surrered 
a permanent loss or a large part of their overseas investments, 
as well as at least a temporary loss of shipping and other 
sources of invisible income. This was a major setback, since 
invisible income including earnings on investments were a 
strategically importantt means of balancing their external 
payments. 
Secondly, physical disruption and loosening of 
political ties in the Far East, accompanied by development 
of synthetic materials in the United States, has reduced 
the volume of our purchases of s uch major items as rubber, 
silk, tin, and jute and has thus diminished the flow of dollare 
available to Europe through triangularr trade. Third, East 
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West trade within Europe itself has shrunk, so that w·estern 
Europe, formerly able to obtain needed agricultural produce 
from the Eastern European countries in exchange for manu-
factures, has been obliged to turn incr easingly to dollar 
sources. The disappearance of Germany as an economic unit 
and dislocation of trade forced on Eastern Germany and the 
satellite nations by the USSR are the final and perhaps most 
disturbing factors underlying the current situation. 
In addition, Western Europe's difficulties have 
been further increased by a rise in prices of primary commo-
dities in relation to prices of manufactured goods. Faced 
with this shift in the terms of trade, Europe is now obliged 
to sell a larger volume of manufactures than formerly in 
order to buy the same volume of foodstuffs and raw materials. 
Certain facts emerge from the foregoing review. 
First, the dollar gap has a long history. Second, after 
making -due allowance for the special circumstances of vmrs 
and their immediate aftermath, it is clear that the problem 
is far more acute today than ever before. Third, the existence 
of the problem is strikingly apparent in the external trade 
of Western Europe and its dependencies, both with the United 
States and with other areas. Fburth, the ~uropean Recovery 
Program has considerably reduced Western Europe's trade def-i-
cit with the world as a whole and the deficiuwith the United 
States were much smaller in 1948, after less than a year.-, of 
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ECA operations, than in 1947. 
Fifth, and most important of all, the solution or 
the dollar gap is still not in sight. 
B. The Taxpayer's Interest 
The economics of the process whereby the government 
has been financing our so-called "favorable balance of trade" 
comes down to two main propositions. 
First, the government's grants and loans to foreign 
countries have in effect been unconscious subsidies to Am-
erican export industries. - The dollars have quickly come 
back and (since domestic demand has not been reduced corres-
pondingly) have provided those industries with ~ger markets 
than they could have had without that governmental action. 
Second, the government's advances to foreign coun-
'• tries have correspondingly increased taxpayer's burden. 
The American taxpayer therefore has a direct interest 
in closing the dollar gap as soon as possible. This is not ' 
to deny his generous interest in the recovery, development, 
and welfare of other, less favorably situated nations, -
an interest which has been amply demonstrated in many ways 
including the Marshall Plan. Nor is - it to deny his obvious 
concern for the prosperity of American industry and agri-
. culture. It is mer-~ly -to say that he does not want to be 
burdened longer than necessary, or to see the problem of 
maintaining prosperity treated as though any expansion of 
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markets had to be brought about by subsidies to maintain 
purchasing power abroad rather than at home. 
c. Parallel Considerations 
Certainly, in closing the dollar gap, certain other: 
vital considerations have to be borne in mind. 
First of these is the need to achieve international 
balance at a high level of trade, ratherthan a low level. 
Second, the United States has a major interest in 
loosening state controls over trade throughout the world, 
and maximizing private initiative. 
In summary, the present critical lack of balance 
in world trade should be corrected primarily by stimulating 
an expansion of exports of goods and services from other 
countries to the United States, accompanied by an expansion, 
1 
as far as feasible, of United States foreign investment. 
D. The Job Can be Done 
a. What European Governments can do 
1. develop a more positive attitude toward exportin 
to the United States. 
ii. promote or provide adequate credit facilities 
to their. exporters, with emphasis on the needs of small 
business. 
iii. work through the Inte~national Monetary Fund 
for a return to single rates of exchange realistically eva-
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luated. 
iv. simplify, reduce and as quickly as possible 
abolish import and export controls. 
v. encourage increased production, particular2y 
in overseas territories, of basic raw materials and agri-
cultural products now in short supply. 
vi. encourage and participate with private business 
interests in the development of the travel plant and faci-
litate to a maximum extent the sales of commodities and 
services to United States tourists. 
b. What European Business and Labor Can Do. - European 
Business can 
i. develop aggressive campaigns to sell in the 
United States market. 
ii. reexamine their channels of distribution and 
historical exports in the United States. 
1ii. ·arrange meetings with American buyers and 
businessmen both in Europe and in the United States, to ex-
change current information on new market opportunities for 
their particular products. 
iv~ personally study United States markets and me-
thods. 
v. maintain larger inventories in the United States 
strategically located to service repeat orders and replace-
ments promptly. 
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vi. participate in all major trade fairs which may 
be held in the United States, either as individual firms or 
in groups. 
vii. cultivate the full potentialities of the 
American tourist trade. 
viii. set up trade promotion staffs in the United 
States to promote exports to this country. 
c, What US Government Can Do, - The United States 
Government can 
l, lower some high American tariffs. 
ii. ease u.s. Customs procedures. 
iii, abandon the "Buy American" restrictions on 
Federal, State, and local government procurement. 
iv. help nations to demolish the oppre~sive con-
trols imposed by the governments of exporting nations. 
d, What U,S, Business and Labor Can Do • . - The .United 
States business and labor can 
i. search the European markets and industries for 
new opportunities to obtain semi-finished products or raw 
materials which can be profitably used in the United States. 
ii. study the costs of distribution within the 
United States to which foreign imports have been subjected. 
iii. reexamine European production for special-
ties which cannot economically be produced by United States 
mass production techniques. 
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I iv. investigate the oppo~tunity for establishing 
"leased departments •• for tne display and sale of imported 
merchandise in department and other stores. 
v. attempt to stimulate additional travel volume 
by organizing facilities for off-season travel. 
e. What the OEEC Can Do. - The Organ~$ation for Euro-
pean Economic - Co-operation should direct its greatest effort 
toward promoting the elimination of trade barriers in European 
countries. 
The task of increasing United States imports from 
Europe will require sustained effort by both business and 
government on both sides of the Atlantic. It is, however, 
by no means impossible of achievement. 
No sigle action or measure, either by government 
or business, should be itself be considered adequate to in-
crease imports into the United States. All measures to 
facilitate exports from the participating countries should 
be initiated at approximately the same time and vigorously 
pursued in order to show appreciable results within a rea-
sonable period of time. 
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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of World War II, Western Europe's 
economy was facing a total collapse. Primarily, there was 
an acute shortage of food and fuel. Industrial output was 
far below the ::• prewar levels. Trade w1 th the outside -world 
suffered serious adverse which was caused by the breakdown 
of trade and production, the rise of import prices, losses 
in visible exports, the crop failures, the segmentation 
of markets and to certain extent.; mistaken policy. Illioreover, 
t here-·was a rising wave of communism in the European na tiona. 
In view of the crises which prevailed in Europe, 
the then Secretary of State of United States, George Marshall, 
made his proposal for European Recovery in a speech on June 
5, 1947. The crucial point of his proposal was that -European 
nations must help themselves through cooperative efforts -
and then a large scale American 11friend.ly aid" will be ex-
tended. 
Marshall's proposal was widely accepted in Europe. 
The Committee of European Economic Cooperation was soon or-
ganized by 16 Western European nations. _ A report was made 
and presented to Secr.etary of State Marshall. The report 
) 
maps out the nations own efforts to make themselves and 
lvestern Europe;-as a whole a going concern by three steps: 
self-help of each nation; mutual help for all the sixteen 
') 
nations; American Aid. 
As to the American side, the enthusiasm of the · 
response from Western Europe was astonishing - pleasantly so -
to the American Government. 
went to work Gn the problem. 
Three Commitees were organized an<· 
Their reports represent the fact i 
ualevidence on which the case of the Marshall Plan is 
baaed. 
The Foreign Assistance Act was passed in both 
Houses of Congress and signed by President Truman on April 
3, 1948. It authorized a foreign aid program of 5.3 billion 
dol.lara for the period of 12 months f'rom June 1948 to June 
1949 to help Western Europe. At the same time, the legis-
lation . set up an Economic Cooperation Administration to ad-
ministrate the program. 
The European Recovery Program has distinct char-
acteristics dif'ferent from the aids and relief rendered by 
the United States previously. The Uni ted utates is providing 
dollar credits - n~ money itself - to the Western European 
nations for recovery. The aid is free to the nations but 
not the individuals. The pay their own governments for the 
purchases in their own currencies, and these "counterpart" 
funds are then used on projects approved by the EOA which will 
further economic recovery. 'l'hus American dollars are doing 
double duny toward rebuilding Europe. 
iv 
Transactions underr·European Recovery Program follow 
the general practice of utilizing private channels of trade 
wherever possible. American exporters go arter the business 
in the same manner that they pursued their normal export-
import trade berore the war; except ror some special conditions 
to be met in handling ECA shipments. 
The EGA serves as the banker for buyers and sellers, 
making sure that the investments in the economic recovery 
of West Europe are on the soundest possible basis to yield 
the greatest returns in \vorld peace and prosperity. 
The first eighteen months of EGA assistance to 
Europe marked a rapid economic advance in Western Europe. 
Industrial production and export trade rose substantially 
and the tide of inflation '\"Tas generally hal ted under the 
impetus - of the Self-help and Mutual aid programs of the 
participating countries and assistance furnished by the 
United States. 
The overall industrial production of the ERP 
h'~her 
nations during the year of 1949 was about 15 percent e.:So7:r 
than prewar and also about 15 percent over the 1948 level. 
Cereal production in the ERP countries during the year in 
many cases surpassed early estimates. There was also a 
substantial expansion of exports for the Western European 
nations. 
vfuen the ERP was undertaken in April 1948, there 
was a rear of accentuating the accompanying inflationary 
pressure through the foreign aid program due to the shortage 
of some critical materials in this country. However, inflation 
did not come. Early in 1949, there was a mild recession 
in some sectors of the economy. ECA financed shipments, in 
many cases, served as an economic mannerr' Of disposing surplus . 
stocks. Incidently, it had stabilizing erfect on the American 
economy. 
In conclusion, we may find that the world trade is 
fundamentally out of balance. Other countries simply a~e 
not earning enough dollars to pay for \vhat they import rrom 
us. They have a udollar shortage". It was mainly because or: 
loss of the Western European's overseas investment; reduced 
imports by the United States; and lastly, the rise in prices 
of importing primary commodity prices. 
The critical lack of balance in world trade should 
be corrected primarily by stimulating an expansion or exports 
of goods and services from other countries to the United 
States, accompanied by an expansion, as far as feasible, or 
United States foreign invesment. The task is to be achieved 
by mutual cooperation of both business and government on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
